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The Efficacy of Shareholder Voting: Evidence from Equity Compensation Plans

Journal of Accounting Research 2013 51(5), 909-950
This study examines the effects of shareholder support for equity compensation plans on subsequent CEO compensation. Using cross‐sectional regression, instrumental variable, and regression discontinuity research designs, we find little evidence that either lower shareholder voting support for, or outright rejection of, proposed equity compensation plans leads to decreases in the level or composition of future CEO incentive compensation. We also find that, in cases where the equity compensation plan is rejected by shareholders, firms are more likely to propose, and shareholders are more likely to approve, a plan the following year. Our results suggest that shareholder votes for equity pay plans have little substantive impact on firms’ incentive compensation policies. Thus, recent regulatory efforts aimed at strengthening shareholder voting rights, particularly in the context of executive compensation, may have limited effect on firms’ compensation policies.

Corporate Governance and the Information Content of Insider Trades

Journal of Accounting Research 2011 49(5), 1249-1274 open access
Most corporate governance research focuses on the behavior of chief executive officers, board members, institutional shareholders, and other similar parties. Little research focuses on the impact of executives whose primary responsibility is to enforce and shape corporate governance inside the firm. This study examines the role of the general counsel (GC) in mitigating informed trading by corporate insiders. We find that insider trading profits and the predictive ability of insider trades for future operating performance are generally higher when insiders trade within firm-imposed restricted trade windows. However, when GC approval is required to execute a trade, insiders’ trading profits and the predictive ability of insider trades for future operating performance are substantively lower. Thus, when given the authority, it appears the GC can effectively limit the extent to which corporate insiders use their private information to extract rents from shareholders.

Chief Executive Officer Equity Incentives and Accounting Irregularities

Journal of Accounting Research 2010 48(2), 225-271
This study examines whether Chief Executive Officer (CEO) equity‐based holdings and compensation provide incentives to manipulate accounting reports. While several prior studies have examined this important question, the empirical evidence is mixed and the existence of a link between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities remains an open question. Because inferences from prior studies may be confounded by assumptions inherent in research design choices, we use propensity‐score matching and assess hidden (omitted variable) bias within a broader sample. In contrast to most prior research, we do not find evidence of a positive association between CEO equity incentives and accounting irregularities after matching CEOs on the observable characteristics of their contracting environments. Instead, we find some evidence that accounting irregularities occur less frequently at firms where CEOs have relatively higher levels of equity incentives.

Board diversity and shareholder voting

Journal of Corporate Finance 2023 83, 102487
The lack of diversity across gender and race of corporate boards has been one of the most significant issues in corporate board governance in recent years. Given the critical role that shareholders have in approving director appointments, we analyze voting patterns in director elections to investigate whether and how shareholders value board diversity. Using a broad sample of director elections from 2008 through 2018, we find evidence that shareholders provide greater voting support for diversity on boards, particularly gender diversity. Our findings also indicate greater additional support for diverse boards rather than for individual candidates. However, the magnitude of incremental voting support for diversity is small, and we find little evidence that the additional support is sufficient to affect voting outcomes. These findings persist over time and across key institutional shareholders who have been some of the most outspoken proponents of board diversity (i.e., SRI funds), questioning shareholders’ commitment to promoting board diversity.

Corporate Governance, Accounting Outcomes, and Organizational Performance

The Accounting Review 2007 82(4), 963-1008 open access
The empirical research examining the association between typical measures of corporate governance and various accounting and economic outcomes has not produced a consistent set of results. We believe that these mixed results are partially attributable to the difficulty in generating reliable and valid measures for the complex construct that is termed “corporate governance.” Using a sample of 2,106 firms and 39 structural measures of corporate governance (e.g., board characteristics, stock ownership, institutional ownership, activist stock ownership, existence of debtholders, mix of executive compensation, and anti-takeover variables), our exploratory principal component analysis suggests that there are 14 dimensions to corporate governance. We find that these indices have a mixed association with abnormal accruals, little relation to accounting restatements, but some ability to explain future operating performance and future excess stock returns.

Trades by Insiders and Mandated Accounting Standards.

The Accounting Review 1983 58(3), 606-620
This paper examines trades by insiders as a means of providing additional evidence regarding whether mandated accounting standards give rise to economic consequences. It is argued that corporate insiders should possess information on the economic consequences of accounting pronouncements (or lack thereof) that is at least as accurate as that possessed by other security market participants. Therefore, "unusual" insider trading around the time of a mandated accounting change suggests that insiders perceive that there are economic consequences associated with the accounting change. This research approach was used to examine the trades by insiders in the period surrounding the exposure draft for FASB Statement No. 19. The results indicate that full-cost insiders were selling (relative to their historical behavior and the behavior of successful-efforts insiders) in this period. One (although not the only) interpretation of this result is that full-cost insiders perceive that FASB Statement No. 19 is associated with adverse economic consequences for their firms.

How much should we trust staggered difference-in-differences estimates?

Journal of Financial Economics 2022 144(2), 370-395 open access
We explain when and how staggered difference-in-differences regression estimators, commonly applied to assess the impact of policy changes, are biased. These biases are likely to be relevant for a large portion of research settings in finance, accounting, and law that rely on staggered treatment timing, and can result in Type-I and Type-II errors. We summarize three alternative estimators developed in the econometrics and applied literature for addressing these biases, including their differences and tradeoffs. We apply these estimators to re-examine prior published results and show, in many cases, the alternative causal estimates or inferences differ substantially from prior papers.

The relation between equity incentives and misreporting: The role of risk-taking incentives

Journal of Financial Economics 2013 109(2), 327-350 open access
Prior research argues that a manager whose wealth is more sensitive to changes in the firm׳s stock price has a greater incentive to misreport. However, if the manager is risk-averse and misreporting increases both equity values and equity risk, the sensitivity of the manager׳s wealth to changes in stock price (portfolio delta) will have two countervailing incentive effects: a positive “reward effect” and a negative “risk effect.” In contrast, the sensitivity of the manager׳s wealth to changes in risk (portfolio vega) will have an unambiguously positive incentive effect. We show that jointly considering the incentive effects of both portfolio delta and portfolio vega substantially alters inferences reported in prior literature. Using both regression and matching designs, and measuring misreporting using discretionary accruals, restatements, and enforcement actions, we find strong evidence of a positive relation between vega and misreporting and that the incentives provided by vega subsume those of delta. Collectively, our results suggest that equity portfolios provide managers with incentives to misreport when they make managers less averse to equity risk.

Diversity Washing

Journal of Accounting Research 2024 62(5), 1661-1709 open access
We provide large‐sample evidence on whether U.S. publicly traded corporations use voluntary disclosures about their commitments to employee diversity opportunistically. We document significant discrepancies between companies' external stances on diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) and their hiring practices. Firms that discuss DEI excessively relative to their actual employee gender and racial diversity (“diversity washers”) obtain superior scores from environmental, social, and governance (ESG) rating organizations and attract more investment from institutional investors with an ESG focus. These outcomes occur even though diversity‐washing firms are more likely to incur discrimination violations and have negative human‐capital‐related news events. Our study provides evidence consistent with growing allegations of misleading statements from firms about their DEI initiatives and highlights the potential consequences of selective ESG disclosures.

Rank-and-file accounting employee compensation and financial reporting quality

Journal of Accounting and Economics 2024 78(1), 101672
We use a proprietary database with detailed, employee-specific compensation contract information for rank-and-file corporate accountants who are directly involved in the financial reporting process to assess their influence on their firms' financial reporting quality. Theory predicts that paying above-market wages can both attract employees with more human capital and subsequently encourage better performance. Consistent with audit committees structuring accountants' compensation to mitigate financial misreporting that might otherwise occur, we find that firms with relatively well-paid accountants tend to issue higher-quality financial reports. Moreover, this relationship is more pronounced when firms’ senior executives have stronger contractual incentives to misreport and when the audit committee is more independent from management.