In this study, we examine whether environmental, social, and governance (ESG) funds' investment decisions are sensitive to the existence and extent of firms' voluntary environmental disclosures. We create our measures of voluntary environmental disclosure using bigrams extracted from the Global Reporting Initiative standards. We provide robust evidence that voluntary environmental disclosure in conference calls is associated with greater ESG fund ownership in the subsequent period, incremental to firms' ESG ratings. We also provide evidence that fund managers' reliance on environmental disclosure is concentrated in water, waste, emissions, and compliance disclosures. ESG fund ownership increases with environmental disclosure that is more positive and specific. Our primary finding persists both when we rely on the sustainability report as an alternative proxy for environmental disclosure and when we use fund‐level tests. Overall, our evidence is consistent with ESG funds relying on firms' disclosures when making investing decisions and inconsistent with recent regulatory concerns that ESG fund managers are not following through on their stated investing strategies

We provide an economics-based review of the pros and cons of ESG disclosures, emphasizing environmental disclosures from an investor-centric perspective. Our survey intends to guide corporate management and regulators in navigating the ESG disclosure terrain. Rather than summarizing the vast and growing ESG literature, we assess the economic arguments for ESG disclosure regulation and the form of this disclosure. We discuss investors’ demand for ESG information and its supply by publicly traded firms. We analyze the case for and against mandatory ESG disclosure. Finally, we weigh the efficiency of disclosure requirement characteristics, assuming mandatory ESG disclosure is warranted. We intend to be positive rather than prescriptive, providing a line of reasoning readers can employ to reach their own conclusions about what we ought to do

I examine how mandatory ESG disclosure regulations transmit to unregulated firms through ESG rating agencies’ peer benchmarking. Using the United Kingdom’s 2017 gender pay gap (GPG) disclosure mandate with its expected positive rating consequences for regulated U.K. firms, I show that unregulated firms with similar Refinitiv ESG ratings are significantly more likely to voluntarily disclose GPG information after the mandate. The effect is more pronounced when peers are defined by ESG rating similarity rather than market capitalization and is not driven by industry affiliation alone. Consistent with ESG ratings creating competitive pressures, spillovers are strongest when U.K. peers were initially lower ranked and when unregulated firms can report relatively better GPG performance. Further analyses show that these spillovers extend to other social disclosures and generalize to the European Union’s Non-Financial Reporting Directive. Overall, the paper highlights how ESG rating structures extend the reach of disclosure regulations beyond their formal scope. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text

This paper offers the first systematic evidence on environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures provided by a large global sample of private equity (PE) firms. Using historical websites from 2000 to 2022, we develop and validate a novel dictionary‐based measure of voluntary PE firm ESG disclosures. Descriptive statistics reveal an increasing time trend in these disclosures, with social topics becoming as important as environmental topics recently. Multivariate analyses show that the demand for ESG information from fund investors is a significant determinant of PE firms’ ESG disclosures. Leveraging data on PE firms’ portfolio companies, we document that more PE firm ESG disclosures are associated with better ESG outcomes at the portfolio company level, suggesting that voluntary ESG disclosures align with real actions for the average PE firm

We compile a novel data set on mandatory environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure around the world to analyze the stock liquidity effects of such disclosure mandates. We document a positive effect of ESG disclosure mandates on firm‐level stock liquidity. The effects are strongest if the disclosure requirements are implemented by government institutions, not on a comply‐or‐explain basis, and coupled with strong enforcement by informal institutions. Firms with weaker information environments benefit more from ESG disclosure mandates. Our results support the view that ESG disclosure regulation improves the information environment and has beneficial capital market effects

This paper examines the impact of environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure on firm investment. The analysis characterizes the optimal precision of ESG disclosure that channels investors’ tastes for ESG into firm investment. Although it is tempting to think that the optimal ESG disclosure becomes more precise when investors care more about ESG, I show this intuition is incomplete because it overlooks the fact that stronger tastes for ESG change how investors use information. Applying the analysis to a large economy, I show that mandating more precise climate disclosure than would be voluntarily provided motivates self-interested firms to act on common interests in reducing emissions. That is, a regulator can leverage market forces and a disclosure mandate to achieve a similar result as a Pigovian tax in motivating firms to internalize the externalities created by their climate-related investments

We examine how natural disasters affect the corporate environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure policies of firms located close to disaster areas. We study firms located in counties neighboring those impacted by natural disasters and find that, on average, these firms increase their ESG disclosure transparency over the period subsequent to the disaster. Given that our sample firms are located outside of the area directly impacted by the disaster, the changes in disclosure transparency after the disaster are consistent with managers increasing their preference for transparency as their risk salience increases. Further, we find that firms with a higher percentage of local institutional ownership are more likely to increase ESG disclosure after experiencing nearby disasters. The findings suggest that managers strategically react to a change in investors' risk perception by increasing ESG disclosure

We provide the first large-sample evidence on third-party verification of firms’ environmental and social metrics in ESG reports (ESG assurance) in the United States. Focusing on the S&P 500 from 2010–2020, we document a striking increase in not only the number of firms with ESG assurance—in 2020 (2010), 76% (38%) of the S&P 500 had an ESG report and 46% (16%) involved assurance—but also the number of metrics assured. Unlike financial audits, ESG assurance varies widely in form and substance, including the choice of metrics assured, the level of assurance, and assuror identity. We show that firms’ decision to obtain ESG assurance is primarily driven by their adoption of ESG reporting frameworks and peer effects, with firm characteristics documented in prior literature playing only a minor role. Assurance is associated with improvements in ESG disclosure, ESG ratings, and the number of institutional investors holding the firm’s stock

We collect a novel dataset on images in Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) reports using deep learning and artificial intelligence (AI), to test hypotheses arising from experimental literature that visual impression management enhances audience perception. We further combine AI and manual methods to contrast images that lack information content (“generic images” evoking broad ESG themes) against images with information content (“specific images” depicting firm-specific ESG activities). We hypothesize and find that firms (1) operating in socially problematic industries (e.g., “sinful”, polluting, or controversial industries), (2) issuing less extensive textual ESG disclosures, and (3) experiencing poor ESG performance tend to use more images, especially generic images, consistent with strategic motivations. We then examine the impact of image usage on stakeholders, observing unduly enhanced perception in retail traders but seldom in institutional investors. We observe that ESG award committees reward specific images and penalize generic images. Our results show that ESG report visual impression management affects stakeholders in the real world, though its impact can be overcome by attention and expertise

This paper studies whether and how environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosure regulations imposed on banks generate transmission effects along the lending channel. I use a setting of U.S. firms borrowing from non‐U.S. banks and exploit the staggered adoption of ESG disclosure regulations in banks’ home countries. I find that exposed borrowers of affected banks improve their environmental and social (E&S) performance following the disclosure mandate. Consistent with banks enhancing both their engagement and selection activities, affected banks impose more environmental action covenants in loan contracts, and they are more likely to terminate a borrower with bad E&S records following the regulation. Further evidence shows that the transmission effects are stronger when a disclosure regulation is well‐enforced (as indicated by a greater increase in banks’ disclosure) and among borrowers with greater switching costs. Collectively, the findings document the role of lending relationships in transmitting the real effect of ESG disclosure regulations from banks to borrowing firms