Nonrenewable resource theory often is summarized by Hotelling's rule. This paper reviews theoretical extensions and empirical investigations of resource extraction models. Observed data are often inconsistent with the Hotelling rule, suggesting that other characteristics of nonrenewable resource supply, including exploration, heterogeneous ore quality, technological progress, and capital investment, are important determinants of the dynamic behavior of resource prices. Given the persistent recurrence of concern about nonrenewable resource scarcity, measures of nonrenewable resource scarcity and the empirical evidence for the time trends of those measures are reviewed. Finally, the implications of nonrenewable resource scarcity for economic growth are examined.

To date, there has been little modeling of the board of directors as an independent entity in the corporate finance literature. Most theoretical papers omit the board entirely and model only managers and shareholders as active players. In this paper, I model the board as an entity distinct from both management and shareholders. The analysis is based on management's power in the selection and retention of board members and it focuses on the effect of this power on the frequency of open dissent in the boardroom and the board's effectiveness in disciplining management. The model predicts behavior consistent with empirical observation and produces testable implications about the links between board compensation, structure, and information and the frequency of board dissent and the level of board effectiveness.

Richard A. Lambert, Customer Satisfaction and Future Financial Performance Discussion of are Nonfinancial Measures Leading Indicators of Financial Performance? An Analysis of Customer Satisfaction, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 36, Studies on Enhancing the Financial Reporting Model (1998), pp. 37-46

Data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth indicate that the employer often pays the explicit costs of not only on‐site training but also off‐site general training. Although few of these costs appear to be passed on to workers in the form of a lower wage while in training, completed spells of general training paid for by previous employers have a larger wage effect than completed spells of general training paid for by the current employer. A model where contract enforcement considerations cause employers to share the costs and returns to purely general training can explain these findings.

This article presents a one-tick dynamic model of a limit order market. Agents choose to submit a limit order or a market order depending on the state of the limit order book. Each trader knows that her order will affect the order placement strategies of those who follow and the execution probability of her limit order is endogenous. All traders take this into account which, in equilibrium, generates systematic patterns in transaction prices and order placement strategies even with no asymmetric information. Article published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Society for Financial Studies in its journal, The Review of Financial Studies.

[This article presents a one-tick dynamic model of a limit order market. Agents choose to submit a limit order or a market order depending on the state of the limit order book. Each trader knows that her order will affect the order placement strategies of those who follow and the execution probability of her limit order is endogenous. All traders take this into account which, in equilibrium, generates systematic patterns in transaction prices and order placement strategies even with no asymmetric information.]