Do new listings of EUREX options affect the prices of discount certificates that are replicated with precisely such a newly listed option? An event study provides a significantly negative average abnormal margin change on the day on which the EUREX option of the replication portfolio is listed. I model the abnormal margin changes as a function of hedging cost, unhedgeable risk, and price pressure. Higher hedging costs, higher opportunity costs from unhedgeable risk, and lower intra-EUWAX competition lead to significantly lower abnormal margin changes. I interpret the effect of intra-EUWAX competition as a price pressure effect. Economically, rebalancing and opportunity costs from unhedgeable risk are the most important drivers of abnormal margin changes when EUREX options are listed.

We study the international spillover effects of sovereign rating events on the stock returns of large banks in nonevent countries. Using S&P rating assessments from 1983 to 2018, we find that negative sovereign rating events spill over to foreign banks’ stock returns through the foreign asset holdings channel, especially if the rating shock to domestic banks is severe. Foreign sovereign debt holdings are not the only source to open such a channel. Negative sovereign rating events also spill over through foreign interbank exposures, but not through foreign claims to nonbank firms. We further find a previously undocumented positive side effect of government support to banks. The guarantee channel limits international spillover effects if banks with strong expected government support are located in countries with high sovereign ratings.

We trace a corporate governance channel of bank shock transmission into the real economy. Using 1,245 U.S. bank enforcement actions (EAs) issued between 1990 and 2017, we show that when a nonfinancial firm (NFF) and bank share a common director, NFF stock prices fall around bank EAs. Severe EAs elicit more negative returns. During enforcement, valued directors substitute NFF board meeting attendance with bank board meeting attendance. Impaired credit relationships, director reputational damage, and endogenous director selection cannot fully explain our results. These findings imply that shared directors could transmit larger bank shocks into the real economy.