I exploit a natural experiment to estimate borrowers’ willingness to pay for a good credit reputation. A lender in Chile offered lower installments to borrowers who were in default. Those who owed more than a fixed arbitrary cutoff were additionally offered a clean public repayment record. Using the cutoff in a fuzzy regression discontinuity design, I show that borrowers are willing to pay the equivalent of 11% of their monthly income for a good reputation. Borrowers use their reputation to take on more debt with other banks, but default more. Thus, renegotiations may impose informational externalities on other lenders.

We show that high-cost debt exacerbates financial constraints by affecting lenders’ perception of credit risk. Using data from a high-cost lender in the UK, we show that high-cost credit reduces applicants’ credit score and future bank credit even though it does not affect future debt repayment. These effects are not present among borrowers who are already tagged as high risk at application, consistent with high-cost credit affecting lenders’ beliefs about borrowers’ creditworthiness. The results highlight a novel channel through which high-cost credit can harm consumers’ financial health: a self-reinforcing stigma of high risk.

This article tests for bias in consumer lending using administrative data from a high-cost lender in the U.K. We motivate our analysis using a new principal-agent model of bias where loan examiners are incentivized to maximize a short-term outcome, not long-term profits, leading to bias against illiquid applicants at the margin of loan decisions. We identify the profitability of marginal applicants using the quasi-random assignment of loan examiners, finding significant bias against immigrant and older applicants when using the firm’s preferred measure of long-run profits but not when using the short-run measure used to evaluate examiner performance. In this case, market incentives based on characteristics that vary across groups lead to inefficient group-based bias.

ABSTRACT We present evidence that restrictions to the set of feasible financial contracts affect buyer‐supplier relationships and the organizational form of the firm. We exploit a regulation that restricted the maturity of the trade credit contracts that a large retailer could sign with some of its small suppliers. Using a within‐product difference‐in‐differences identification strategy, we find that the restriction reduces the likelihood of trade by 11%. The retailer also responds by internalizing procurement to its own subsidiaries and reducing overall purchases. Finally, we find that relational contracts can mitigate the inability to extend long trade credit terms.

We exploit a natural experiment in the largest online consumer lending platform to provide the first evidence that loan terms, in particular maturity choice, can be used to screen borrowers based on their private information. We compare two groups of observationally equivalent borrowers who took identical unsecured 36-month loans; for only one of the groups, a 60-month loan was also available. When a long-maturity option is available, fewer borrowers take the short-term loan, and those who do default less. Additional findings suggest borrowers self-select on private information about their future ability to repay. Received December 27, 2016; editorial decision December 12, 2017 by Editor Philip Strahan. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web Site next to the link to the final published paper online.

We exploit a natural experiment to provide one of the first measurements of the causal effect of negative credit information on employment and earnings. We estimate that one additional year of negative credit information reduces employment by 3 percentage points and wage earnings by $1, 000. In comparison, the decrease in credit is only one-fourth as large. Negative credit information also causes an increase in self-employment and a decrease in mobility. Further evidence suggests this cost of default is inefficiently borne by those most creditworthy among previous defaulters. Received April 5, 2017; editorial decision September 2, 2017 by Editor Andrew Karolyi. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web Site next to the link to the final published paper online.

This paper investigates the effects of college tuition on student debt and human capital accumulation. We exploit data from a random sample of undergraduate students in the United States and implement a research design that instruments for realized tuition with relatively large changes to the advertised tuition of students who enrolled at the same school in different cohorts. We find that $5,000 in higher tuition causally reduces the probability of graduating with a graduate degree by 3.1 percentage points and increases student debt by $1,480. Higher tuition also leads to a decline in mortgage balances and an increase in credit card delinquencies. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.