Equity analysts are often hired by firms they cover. I document the extent to which this revolving door phenomenon impairs analysts' independence. I do this by examining the presence of biased research reports issued during the year before analysts are employed by a firm they cover. I find that during their final year, revolving door analysts bias their EPS forecasts, their target prices, and their recommendations in a direction that suggests that they are attempting to gain favor from their prospective employers. Specifically, relative to other analysts, revolving door analysts issue more optimistic reports on the firms that hire them, and they issue more pessimistic reports on firms that do not hire them. These results suggest the presence of strategic bias, although more innocuous interpretations cannot be completely ruled out. JEL Classifications: G14; G17; G24; G28; M41. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the text.

Using unique new data, we examine whether brokerage trading volume creates a conflict of interest for analysts. We find that earnings forecast optimism is associated with higher brokerage volume, even controlling for forecast and analyst quality, recommendations, and target prices. However, forecast accuracy is also significantly associated with higher volume. When analysts change brokerage houses, they bring trading volume with them, influencing trading volume at the new brokerage. This indicates that analysts drive the volume effects we observe. Consistent with a reward for generating volume, brokerage houses are less likely to demote analysts who generate more volume. Finally, analysts strategically adjust forecast optimism based on expected volume impact. Analysts become more (less) optimistic if their optimistic forecasts in the prior year were more (less) successful at generating volume. However, consistent with higher costs to increasing accuracy, analysts do not update accuracy based on expected volume impact. Overall, our results are consistent with a brokerage trading volume conflict of interest moving analysts towards more optimistic earnings forecasts, despite the volume reward for accuracy.

We study individual investors’ paid news subscriptions. Among individual investors, only 4% of individual-quarters include a news subscription, and 1.2% include a financial news subscription. These low rates mask substantial variation across news sources and over time. Within financial news, approximately 30% of aggregate subscription dollars are spent on crowdsourced news, with the remaining 70% spent on traditional financial news. Subscription dollars vary over time, with crowdsourced news at times matching or exceeding traditional financial news. We also find that subscriptions are correlated with capital market activity. Aggregated payments for subscriptions, particularly for crowdsourced news, are correlated with stock market valuation, trading volume, and investment. Similarly, within individuals, the association between subscriptions and investment is driven primarily by crowdsourced news: subscribing is associated with a $280 increase in quarterly investment. Overall, our findings highlight variation in individual investors’ news subscriptions and their correlated investment activities.

While the production of credit ratings has long been limited mainly to rating agencies (CRAs), recent years have seen the growing popularity of consensus credit ratings crowdsourced from banks (i.e., bank ratings). We provide the first comprehensive examination of the properties and informativeness of bank ratings relative to CRA ratings. We find that bank ratings often deviate from CRA ratings, with over 60% of firm-months having different bank and CRA ratings. These deviations contain useful information. Bank ratings improve out-of-sample prediction of defaults and CRA rating revisions and explain the cross-section of credit spreads. However, bank ratings do not improve out-of-sample prediction of credit excess returns, indicating that current prices incorporate bank rating information. Overall our findings suggest that bank ratings are a useful supplement to traditional credit ratings.

The revised Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) requires the unbundling of research payments from trading execution, fundamentally changing the way in which investors typically pay for analyst research in Europe. We examine the effectiveness of the regulation in changing the link between analyst research and trading, the research‐trading link, and the analyst response to this potential change in incentives. Using a difference‐in‐differences research design, we find that forecast frequency, optimism, and accuracy are less associated with the brokerage trading share after MiFID II, suggesting that MiFID II weakened the link between the brokerage share of trading and analyst research. Following MiFID II, analysts in Europe are less likely than analysts in the United States to continue high forecast frequency, optimism, and accuracy for stocks with high share importance for the analyst's brokerage house. We find similar results throughout for buy/sell recommendations. Overall, our evidence suggests that MiFID II is at least partially successful in unbundling research from execution, and impacts both the trading effects and the production of analyst research.

We present evidence of first impression bias among finance professionals in the field. Equity analysts’ forecasts, target prices, and recommendations suffer from first impression bias. If a firm performs particularly well (poorly) in the year before an analyst follows it, that analyst tends to issue optimistic (pessimistic) evaluations. Consistent with negativity bias, we find that negative first impressions have a stronger effect than positive ones. The market adjusts for analyst first impression bias with a lag. Finally, our findings contribute to the literature on experience effects. We show that a set of professionals in the field, equity analysts, apply U-shaped weights to their sequence of past experiences, with greater weight on first experiences and recent experiences than on intermediate ones.

Psychological evidence indicates that decision quality declines after an extensive session of decision-making, a phenomenon known as decision fatigue. We study whether decision fatigue affects analysts’ judgments. Analysts cover multiple firms and often issue several forecasts in a single day. We find that forecast accuracy declines over the course of a day as the number of forecasts the analyst has already issued increases. Also consistent with decision fatigue, we find that the more forecasts an analyst issues, the higher the likelihood the analyst resorts to more heuristic decisions by herding more closely with the consensus forecast, self-herding (i.e., reissuing their own previous outstanding forecasts), and issuing a rounded forecast. Finally, we find that the stock market understands these effects and discounts for analyst decision fatigue.

Leveraging micro‐level data on individual employees’ bank and credit card transactions, we examine the impact of earnings announcement (EA) news on employee spending. Utilizing an event study methodology, we find strong evidence that EA news elicits significant reactions in employee spending. These reactions are stronger for employees located in the firm's headquarters state, with longer tenure, possessing investment experience, or earning higher wages, consistent with these employees being more likely to attend to their firm's EAs. The reactions are also stronger for the fourth fiscal quarter than interim quarters, suggesting that year‐end results garner greater employee attention. Furthermore, consistent with media facilitating employee processing of EA news, the reactions are stronger for EAs covered by a larger number of news articles. Finally, in line with the notion that EAs contain information about employees’ future cash flows, we find that EA news predicts changes in employee wages and that employees with higher past wage‐to‐EA news sensitivity exhibit stronger spending reactions. Overall, our findings provide evidence of the role of financial reporting in employees’ spending decisions.

Over three-quarters of U.S. taxpayers receive federal tax refunds, largely due to income tax over-withholding. This study explores how over-withholding impacts investments by comparing individuals’ investment behavior following wage receipts and tax refunds. We find a significantly higher marginal propensity to invest out of wages than refunds, suggesting that over-withholding, which alters the labeling and timing of income, meaningfully influences financial decision-making. Our cross-sectional analysis indicates that the differential investment rates are more pronounced for individuals with automatic investment setups and lower financial sophistication. The difference cannot be fully explained by alternative explanations such as lack of awareness, fixed dollar investment goals, timing differences between wages and refunds, uncertainty of refunds, transaction costs, or the perception of refunds as additional windfall income. Our findings underscore the importance of considering behavioral factors in the formulation of tax policies and contribute to the accounting literature that examines taxes and investment behavior.