We examine the role of firms' government connections, defined by government intervention in CEO appointment and the status of state ownership, in determining the severity of financial constraints faced by Chinese firms. We demonstrate that government connections are associated with substantially less severe financial constraints (i.e., less reliance on internal cash flows to fund investment), and that the sensitivity of investment to internal cash flows is higher for firms that report greater obstacles to obtaining external funds. We also find that those large non-state firms with weak government connections, likely the engine for innovation in the coming years in China, are especially financially constrained, due perhaps to the formidable hold that their state rivals have on financial resources after the ‘grabbing-the-big-and-letting-go-the-small’ privatization program in China. Our empirical results suggest that government connections play an important role in explaining Chinese firms' financing conditions, and provide further evidence on the nature of the misallocation of credit by China's dominant state-owned banks.

We study the effect of financial market frictions on managerial compensation. We embed a market microstructure model into an otherwise standard contracting framework, and analyze optimal pay-for-performance when managers use information they learn from the market in their investment decisions. In a less frictional market, the improved information content of stock prices helps guide managerial decisions and thereby necessitates lower-powered compensation. Exploiting a randomized experiment, we document evidence that pay-for-performance is lowered in response to reduced market frictions. Firm investment also becomes more sensitive to stock prices during the experiment, consistent with increased managerial learning from the market. (JEL D83, G12, G14, G32, G34, M12, M52)

Adverse market events can affect credit supply not only by hurting financial fundamentals but also by changing the risk-taking behaviors of individual decision-makers. We provide micro-level evidence of this individual decision-making channel in the U.S. mortgage market. We find that mortgage application rejection rates are more sensitive to foreclosure intensity when loan officers are more exposed to foreclosure news, despite the same housing market and bank fundamentals. Loans originated from the affected branches have lower ex post default rates, consistent with higher lending standards being applied. In the aggregate, this effect results in tighter credit supply during housing market downturns.

We analyze a model in which an anomaly is unknown to arbitrageurs until its discovery, and test the model implications on both asset prices and arbitrageurs’ trading activities. Using data on 99 anomalies documented in the existing literature, we find that the discovery of an anomaly reduces the correlation between the returns of its decile-1 and decile-10 portfolios. This discovery effect is stronger if the aggregate wealth of hedge funds is more volatile. Finally, hedge funds increase (reverse) their positions in exploiting anomalies when their aggregate wealth increases (decreases), further suggesting that these discovery effects operate through arbitrage trading.

This paper provides a comprehensive survey of existing measures of uncertainty, risk, and volatility, noting their conceptual distinctions. It summarizes how they are constructed, their relative advantages in usage, and their effects on financial market and economic outcomes. The measures are divided into four categories based on the construction methodology: news-based, survey-based, econometric-based, and market-based measures. While heightened uncertainty is typically associated with negative real and financial outcomes, the magnitude of these effects and the interpretation of transmission channels crucially depend on identification considerations.(JEL C83, D81, E10, E52, E60, F10, G10)