We find that firms that provide limited liability and indemnification for their directors enjoy higher credit ratings and lower yield spreads. We argue that such provisions insulate corporate directors from the discipline from potential litigation, and allow them to pursue their own interests by adopting low-risk, self-serving operating strategies, which coincidentally redound to the benefit of corporate bondholders. Our evidence further suggests that the reduction in the cost of debt may offset the costs of directorial shirking and suboptimal corporate policies occasioned by this insulation, which may explain why stockholders have little incentive to rescind these legal protections.

When does a common group identity improve efficiency in coordination games? To answer this question, we propose a group-contingent social preference model and derive conditions under which social identity changes equilibrium selection. We test our predictions in the minimum-effort game in the laboratory under parameter configurations which lead to an inefficient low-effort equilibrium for subjects with no group identity. For those with a salient group identity, consistent with our theory, we find that learning leads to ingroup coordination to the efficient high-effort equilibrium. Additionally, our theoretical framework reconciles findings from a number of coordination game experiments.

[We introduce a new class of parametric models applicable to a mixture of high and low frequency returns and revisit the concept of news impact curves introduced by Engle and Ng (1993). Overall, we find that moderately good (intra-daily) news reduces volatility (the next day), while both very good news (unusual high intra-daily positive returns) and bad news (negative returns) increase volatility, with the latter having a more severe impact. The asymmetries disappear over longer horizons. Models featuring asymmetries dominate in terms of out-of-sample forecasting performance, especially during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.]

This paper investigates the time-varying corporate bond index returns in a multi-factor smooth transition regression model. We find that expected index returns vary between weak and strong economic regimes, where the transition from one regime to the other is governed by the 3-quartered growth of industrial production. Weak economic regimes are characterized by low growth of industrial production, vice versa for strong economic regimes. Further, risk factor sensitivities are generally more negative in strong economic regimes than in weak regimes, implying that index returns are low when economic conditions are good and high when economic conditions are poor.

This paper examines the use of derivatives and its relation with risk taking in the hedge fund industry. In a large sample of hedge funds, 71% of the funds trade derivatives. After controlling for fund strategies and characteristics, derivatives users on average exhibit lower fund risks (e.g., market risk, downside risk, and event risk), such risk reduction is especially pronounced for directional-style funds. Further, derivatives users engage less in risk shifting and are less likely to liquidate in a poor market state. However, the flow-performance relation suggests that investors do not differentiate derivatives users when making investing decisions.

Theory suggests that a firm facing competition will raise prices as consumer preferences become more diverse, and with high enough diversity, a duopolist under product differentiation may price higher than a monopolist. Focusing on the price for cable modem Internet access, with or without DSL competition, and using the standard deviation of education attainment as a proxy for preference diversity, we find empirical support for these results. In markets where cable competes with DSL, the cable Internet price increases with preference diversity. Moreover, the cable Internet price under DSL competition can exceed that without competition when preferences are sufficiently diverse.

I argue that the reason the book-to-market effect is stronger in small stocks is because smaller stocks generally have shorter life expectancy and therefore shorter equity duration. I build a model in which the book-to-market effect is stronger in stocks with shorter life expectancy. Empirically, I use delisting probability as my proxy for life expectancy. The data support my model's central prediction and its additional implications for stock return and variance. My results provide a rational explanation for the heterogeneity of the book-to-market effect, evidence previously taken as support for behavioral explanations.

We examine whether the sign and magnitude of intra-daily returns have impact on expected volatility the next day or over longer future horizons. We first let the ’data speak’, namely with minimal interference we capture the mapping between intra-daily returns and future volatility. We revisit the concept of news impact curves introduced by Engle and Ng (1993). Overall, we find that moderately good (intra-daily) news reduces volatility (the next day), while both very good news (unusual high intra-daily positive returns) and bad news (negative returns) increase volatility, with the latter having a more severe impact. The asymmetries disappear over longer horizons. We also introduce a new class of parametric models which feature asymmetries and with close ties to ARCH-type models, albeit applicable to a mixture of high and low frequency data. Models featuring asymmetries dominate, especially during the 2007-2008 financial crisis. ∗We like to thank Oliver Linton for comments and sharing with us software. In addition, we like to thank the Referees and the Editor for many helpful suggestions and comments on a previous version of