[This article studies bank failures in twenty-one emerging market countries in the 1990s. By using a competing risk hazard model for bank survival, we show that a government is less likely to take over or close a failing bank if the banking system is weak. This Too-Many-to-Fail effect is robust to controlling for macroeconomic factors, financial crises, the Too-Big-to-Fail effect, domestic financial development, and concerns due to systemic risk and information spillovers. The article also shows that the Too-Many-to-Fail effect is stronger for larger banks and when there is a large government budget deficit.]

This article studies bank failures in twenty-one emerging market countries in the 1990s. By using a competing risk hazard model for bank survival, we show that a government is less likely to take over or close a failing bank if the banking system is weak. This Too-Many-to-Fail effect is robust to controlling for macroeconomic factors, financial crises, the Too-Big-to-Fail effect, domestic financial development, and concerns due to systemic risk and information spillovers. The article also shows that the Too-Many-to-Fail effect is stronger for larger banks and when there is a large government budget deficit.

This paper examines betting line changes from the opening to the closing of the point spread betting market on National Basketball Association games for evidence of informed trader betting. We show that within-betting period line changes significantly improve the accuracy of betting lines as forecasts of game outcomes. We examine individual line change magnitudes and show that these are directly and proportionately related to biases in opening lines. Further, line changes are of sufficient magnitude to remove these biases by the close of betting. We interpret these results as evidence that informed traders are influential in this market.

This paper examines betting line changes from the opening to the closing of the point spread betting market on National Basketball Association games for evidence of informed trader betting. We show that within‐betting period line changes significantly improve the accuracy of betting lines as forecasts of game outcomes. We examine individual line change magnitudes and show that these are directly and proportionately related to biases in opening lines. Further, line changes are of sufficient magnitude to remove these biases by the close of betting. We interpret these results as evidence that informed traders are influential in this market.

Longstaff [Longstaff, F., 2000. The term structure of very short-term rates: new evidence for the expectations hypothesis. Journal of Financial Economics 58, 397–415] finds support for the expectations hypothesis at the very short end of the repurchase agreement (repo) term structure while other studies find calendar-time-based regularities cause rejection of the expectations hypothesis. Using Longstaff’s methods on a sample of repo rates that pre-dates Longstaff’s sample, we reject the expectations hypothesis for every maturity. The pre-Longstaff-sample repo data comes from a time period where the behavior of short-term interest rates is similar to the long-run average behavior of short-term interest rates. Our results imply that expectations hold when rates are less volatile and/or that we may be entering a period of lower volatility.