In this paper, I examine the sensitivity of promotion and demotion decisions for lower‐level managers to financial and nonfinancial measures of their performance and investigate the extent to which the behavior of lower‐level managers reflects promotion‐based incentives. Additionally, I test for learning versus effort‐allocation effects of promotion‐based incentives. I find that promotion and demotion decisions for store managers of a major U.S.‐based fast‐food retailer (QSR) are sensitive to nonfinancial performance measures of service quality and employee retention after controlling for financial performance. The likelihood of demotion in this organization is also sensitive to nonfinancial performance on the dimension of service quality, while the probability of exit is primarily sensitive to financial performance measures rather than nonfinancial performance measures. I also find evidence that the behavior of lower‐level managers is consistent with the incentives created by the weighting of nonfinancial performance measures in promotion decisions. Managers in locations where there is a higher ex ante probability of promotion and a higher potential reward upon promotion demonstrate significantly higher levels and rates of performance improvement in service quality. Finally, consistent with promotion‐based incentives inducing both effort‐allocation and learning effects, I find that performance‐improvement rates for service quality: (1) are higher in prepromotion periods in markets where promotions occur, (2) decrease immediately after the occurrence of a promotion in the same market area, and (3) remain higher than in markets where promotions do not occur. These findings provide some of the first empirical evidence on an alternative to the explicit weighting of nonfinancial metrics in compensation contracts as a mechanism for generating improvements in nonfinancial dimensions of performance.

[We test whether capital account liberalization led to higher economic growth using de jure measures of capital account and financial current account openness for 94 nations, from 1950 (or independence) onward. We argue that measurement error, differing time periods used, and collinearity among independent variables account for conflicting results in prior scholarship. We use pooled time-series, cross-sectional OLS and system GMM estimators to examine economic growth rates, 1955-2004. Capital account liberalization had a positive association with growth in both developed and emerging market nations. We confirm that equity market liberalization has an independent effect on economic growth.]

Over the past decade, the distances between small businesses and their bank lenders have increased substantially, as increasing numbers of bank lenders have implemented credit-scoring models to evaluate the creditworthiness of small businesses. These developments are antithetical to the traditional small business lending process, which emphasizes local proximity, bank–borrower relationships, and qualitative information. We theoretically model and empirically test whether and how these changes have affected the probability that small business loans default, using 1984–2001 data from the SBA's flagship lending program. On average, both distance and credit scoring are associated with higher default probabilities—the former suggests that distance interferes with information collection, while the latter suggests that production efficiencies encourage credit-scoring lenders to expand output by making riskier loans at the margin. The default-increasing effects of distance are substantially dampened at credit scoring banks, however, suggesting that hard-information lending approaches may outperform soft-information, relationship-based lending approaches in long-distance situations.

This article makes two important contributions to the literature on the incentive effects of insider ownership. First, it presents a clean method for separating the positive wealth effect of insider ownership from the negative entrenchment effect, which can be applied to samples of companies from the US and any other country. Second, it measures the effects of insider ownership using a measure of firm performance, namely a marginal q, which ensures that the causal relationship estimated runs from ownership to performance. The article applies this method to a large sample of publicly listed firms from the Anglo-Saxon and Civil law traditions and confirms that managerial entrenchment has an unambiguous negative effect on firm performance as measured by both Tobin's (average) q and our marginal q, and that the wealth effect of insider ownership is unambiguously positive for both measures. We also test for the effects of ownership concentration for other categories of owners and find that while institutional ownership improves the performance in the USA, financial institutions have a negative impact in other Anglo-Saxon countries and in Europe.

Share repurchases help alleviate agency costs of surplus cash by restricting management’s scope to waste corporate resources. But why do self-interested managers agree to disgorge surplus cash in the first place? This study examines the intervening effect of managerial monitoring and incentive alignment mechanisms on the decision to distribute excess cash through a share repurchase. Findings indicate that repurchases substitute for cash retention decisions that would otherwise prove costly for shareholders, and that better managerial incentive alignment and closer monitoring by external shareholders are important factors stimulating such payouts.

We test whether capital account liberalization led to higher economic growth using de jure measures of capital account and financial current account openness for 94 nations, from 1950 (or independence) onward. We argue that measurement error, differing time periods used, and collinearity among independent variables account for conflicting results in prior scholarship. We use pooled time-series, cross-sectional OLS and system GMM estimators to examine economic growth rates, 1955–2004. Capital account liberalization had a positive association with growth in both developed and emerging market nations. We confirm that equity market liberalization has an independent effect on economic growth.

In this paper, we use a unique long-run dataset of regulatory constraints on capital account openness to explain stock market correlations. Since stock returns themselves are highly volatile, any examination of what drives correlations needs to focus on long runs of data. This is particularly true since some of the short-term changes in co-movements appear to reverse themselves (Delroy Hunter 2005). We argue that changes in the co-movement of indices have not been random. Rather, they are mainly driven by greater freedom to move funds from one country to another. In related work, Geert Bekaert and Campbell Harvey (2000) show that equity correlations increase after liberalization of capital markets, using a number of case studies from emerging countries. We examine this pattern systematically for the last century, and find it to be most pronounced in the recent past. We compare the importance of capital account openness with one main alternative explanation, the growing synchronization of economic fundamentals. We conclude that greater openness has been the single most important cause of growing correlations during the last quarter of a century, though increasingly correlated economic fundamentals also matter. In the conclusion, we offer some thoughts on why the effects of greater openness appear to be so much stronger today than they were during the last era of globalization before 1914.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

What has driven trade booms and trade busts in the past century and a half? Was it changes in global output or in the costs of international trade? To address this question, we derive a micro-founded measure of aggregate bilateral trade costs based on a standard model of trade in differentiated goods. These trade costs gauge the difference between observed bilateral trade and frictionless trade in terms of an implied markup on retail prices of foreign goods. Thus, we are able to estimate the combined magnitude of tariffs, transportation costs, and all other macroeconomic frictions that impede interna tional trade but that are inherently difficult to observe. We use this measure to examine the growth of global trade between 1870 and 1913, its retreat from 1921 to 1939, and its subsequent rise from 1950 to 2000. We find that trade cost declines explain roughly 55 percent of the pre– World War I trade boom and 33 percent of the post–World War II trade boom, while a precipi tous rise in trade costs explains the entire inter