We use high-frequency data to precisely estimate bond price reactions to macroeconomic announcements and the associated compensation for macro risks. We find evidence of a single factor summarizing the reaction of bond prices to different announcements. Before the financial crisis, the factor risk premium is substantial, significant, and mainly earned before announcement releases. After the crisis, the stock–bond covariance becomes negative and the preannouncement factor risk premium becomes insignificant. Our empirical results are consistent with information leakages that take place ahead of announcement releases and with the implications of a long-run risks model of bond risk premia.

This article introduces a new holding horizon measure of active management and examines its relation to future risk-adjusted fund performance (alpha). Our measure reveals a wide cross-sectional dispersion in mutual fund investment horizons, and shows that long-horizon funds exhibit positive future long-term alphas by holding stocks with superior long-term fundamentals. Further, stocks largely held by long-horizon funds outperform stocks largely held by short-horizon funds by more than $ 3% $ annually, adjusted for risk, over the following 5-year period. We also find a clientele effect: to reduce liquidity costs, long-horizon funds attract more long-term investors through share classes that carry load fees.

This paper investigates the relation between crowded trades, those in which many investors hold the same stocks possibly exhausting their liquidity provision, and future stock returns on a set of well-known stock market anomalies. We find that anomaly risk-adjusted returns are primarily generated by the most (least) crowded stocks for the long-leg (short-leg) portfolio. Moreover, we find that our results remain significant after publication dates. We hypothesize that crowded equity positions in anomaly stocks increase institutional investors’ exposure to crash risk. Our findings are consistent with this hypothesis and suggest that crowding adds a new consideration to the limits of arbitrage.