We examine the extent to which vertical and horizontal market structure can together explain incomplete retail pass-through. To answer this question, we use scanner data from a large U.S. retailer to estimate product level pass-through for three vertical structures: national brands, private label goods not manufactured by the retailer, and private label goods manufactured by the retailer. Our approach circumvents issues associated with internal firm prices and demonstrates that accounting for horizontal market structure is important for measuring the effects of vertical integration and reduced double marginalization on pass-through.

We address how using different censoring thresholds and imputation procedures affects the baseline results of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015). Higher censoring thresholds introduce measure ment error and outliers that generate wide variability in results across weighting schemes, but methods that explicitly control for outliers confirm the results of Coibion, Gorodnichenko, and Hong (2015) for all censoring thresholds. We also illustrate how the BLS’s approach to imputing missing prices can introduce a cyclical bias into measures of posted price inflation when store-switching is present in the data. (JEL D12, E31, E32, L25, L81)

We study the cyclical properties of sales, regular price changes, and average prices paid by consumers (“effective” prices) using data on prices and quantities sold for numerous retailers across many US metropolitan areas. Inflation in the effective prices paid by consumers declines significantly with higher unemployment while little change occurs in the inflation rate of prices posted by retailers. This difference reflects the reallocation of household expenditures across retailers, a feature of the data which we document and quantify, rather than sales. We propose a simple model with household store-switching and assess its implications for business cycles and policymakers. (JEL D12, E31, E32, L25, L81)

Abstract We study the role of financial frictions for productivity. Using a rich cross-country firm-level data, we exploit variation in preexisting exposure to the 2008 global financial crisis to study the post-crisis productivity slowdown. Firms with weaker precrisis balance sheets experienced a highly persistent decline in post-crisis total factor productivity growth relative to their less vulnerable counterparts, accounting for about one-third of the within-firm productivity slowdown. This decline was larger for firms that faced a more severe tightening of credit conditions. Financially fragile firms cut back on innovation activities, one channel through which financial frictions weakened post-crisis productivity growth.