The federal tax code creates strong incentives for tax arbitrage on the part of state governments. This arbitrage activity is illegal and previous research has typically assumed that the constraint against arbitrage activity is binding. This paper explicitly tests this proposition by considering whether financial asset holdings increase as the yield spread between taxable and tax exempt securities rises. Using a data set on 40 state governments over a seven year period, I find that there is a significant response to changes in the yield spread. One implication of these results is that the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which made even greater efforts to curb arbitrage activity, is likely to be ineffective.

Tax expenditures are a major source of support for energy related to activities in the federal budget exceeding direct budget support for energy by a factor of nearly six. Focusing on the policy goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions and petroleum consumption, I find these tax expenditures highly cost ineffective at best and counterproductive at worse. The tax credit for ethanol is an example of a cost ineffective subsidy. The cost of reducing CO2 emissions through this subsidy exceeded $1,700 per ton of CO2 avoided in 2006 and the cost of reducing oil consumption over $85 per barrel.

An important factor driving energy policy over the past two decades has been the “energy paradox,” the perception that consumers apply unreasonably high hurdle rates to energy-saving investments. We explore one possible explanation for this apparent puzzle: that realized returns fall short of the returns promised by engineers and product manufacturers. Using a unique data set, we find that the realized return to attic insulation is statistically significant, but the median estimate (9.7%) is almost identical to a discount rate for this investment implied by a CAPM analysis. We conclude that the case for the energy paradox is weaker than has previously been believed.

This paper examines the effect of federal deductibility of state and local taxes on the fiscal behavior of state and local governments. The primary finding is that deductibility affects the way that state-local governments finance their spending as well as the overall level of spending.