I explore the equilibrium value implications of economic models that incorporate responses to a stochastic environment with growth. I propose dynamic valuation decompositions (DVD's) designed to distinguish components of an underlying economic model that influence values over long investment horizons from components that impact only the short run. A DVD represents the values of stochastically growing claims to consumption payoffs or cash flows using a stochastic discount process that both discounts the future and adjusts for risk. It is enabled by constructing operators indexed by the elapsed time between the trading date and the date of the future realization of the payoff. Thus formulated, methods from applied mathematics permit me to characterize valuation behavior and the term structure of risk prices in a revealing manner. I apply this approach to investigate how investor beliefs and the associated uncertainty are reflected in current-period values and risk-price elasticities.

We develop results for the use of LASSO and Post-LASSO methods to form firststage predictions and estimate optimal instruments in linear instrumental variables (IV) models with many instruments, p, that apply even when p is much larger than the sample size, n.We rigorously develop asymptotic distribution and inference theory for the resulting IV estimators and provide conditions under which these estimators are asymptotically oracle-efficient.In simulation experiments, the LASSO-based IV estimator with a data-driven penalty performs well compared to recently advocated many-instrument-robust procedures.In an empirical example dealing with the effect of judicial eminent domain decisions on economic outcomes, the LASSObased IV estimator substantially reduces estimated standard errors allowing one to draw much more precise conclusions about the economic effects of these decisions.Optimal instruments are conditional expectations; and in developing the IV results, we also establish a series of new results for LASSO and Post-LASSO estimators of non-parametric conditional expectation functions which are of independent theoretical and practical interest.Specifically, we develop the asymptotic theory for these estimators that allows for non-Gaussian, heteroscedastic disturbances, which is important for econometric applications.By innovatively using moderate deviation theory for self-normalized sums, we provide convergence rates for these estimators that are as sharp as in the homoscedastic Gaussian case under the weak condition that log p = o(n 1/3 ).Moreover, as a practical innovation, we provide a fully data-driven method for choosing the user-specified penalty that must be provided in obtaining LASSO and Post-LASSO estimates and establish its asymptotic validity under non-Gaussian, heteroscedastic disturbances.

Instrumental variable (IV) methods are widely used to identify causal effects in models with endogenous explanatory variables. Often the instrument exclusion restriction that underlies the validity of the usual IV inference is suspect; that is, instruments are only plausibly exogenous. We present practical methods for performing inference while relaxing the exclusion restriction. We illustrate the approaches with empirical examples that examine the effect of 401(k) participation on asset accumulation, price elasticity of demand for margarine, and returns to schooling. We find that inference is informative even with a substantial relaxation of the exclusion restriction in two of the three cases.

Abstract Tropical deforestation accounts for almost one-fifth of greenhouse gas emissions and threatens the world’s most diverse ecosystems. Much of this deforestation is driven by illegal logging. We use novel satellite data that tracks annual deforestation across eight years of Indonesian institutional change to examine how local officials’ incentives affect deforestation. Increases in the number of political jurisdictions lead to increased deforestation and lower timber prices, consistent with Cournot competition between jurisdictions. Illegal logging and local oil and gas rents are short-run substitutes, but this effect disappears over time with political turnover. The results illustrate how local officials’ incentives affect deforestation and show how standard economic theories can explain illegal behavior.