In this study we analyze how CEO risk incentives affect the efficiency of research and development (R&D) investments. We examine a sample of 843 cases in which firms increase their R&D investments by an economically significant amount over the period of 1995–2006. We find that firms with higher sensitivity of CEO compensation portfolio value to stock volatility (vega) are more likely to have large increases in R&D investments. More importantly, we find that high-vega firms experience lower abnormal stock returns and lower operating performance compared to their low-vega counterparts following the R&D increases. Our main results hold in a variety of robustness tests. The results are consistent with the conjecture that high-vega compensation portfolios may induce managers to overinvest in inefficient R&D projects and therefore hurt firm performance.

We examine the empirical association between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and tax avoidance. Our findings suggest that firms with excessive irresponsible CSR activities have a higher likelihood of engaging in tax-sheltering activities and greater discretionary/permanent book-tax differences. Moreover, at the onset of FASB Interpretation No. 48, these firms have more uncertain tax positions; also, these firms' initial tax positions are likely supported by weaker facts and circumstances as indicated by their larger post-FIN 48 settlements with tax authorities and their higher likelihood of a net decrease in the overall level of uncertain tax positions after FIN 48. Collectively, these results suggest that firms with excessive irresponsible CSR activities are more aggressive in avoiding taxes, lending credence to the idea that corporate culture affects tax avoidance. Data Availability: Data are available from public sources identified in the study.