This paper estimates and compares two groups of high-frequency market-based systemic risk measures using European and US interbank rates, stock prices and credit derivatives data from 2004 to 2009. Measures belonging to the macro group gauge the overall tension in the financial sector and micro group measures rely on individual institution information to extract joint distress. We rank the measures using three criteria: (i) Granger causality tests, (ii) Gonzalo and Granger metric, and (iii) correlation with an index of systemic events and policy actions. We find that the best systemic measure in the macro group is the first principal component of a portfolio of Credit Default Swap (CDS) spreads whereas the best measure in the micro group is the multivariate densities computed from CDS spreads. These results suggest that the measures based on CDSs outperform measures based on interbank rates or stock market prices.

This paper explores the dynamic relationship between stock market implied credit spreads, CDS spreads, and bond spreads. A general VECM representation is proposed for changes in the three credit spread measures which accounts for zero, one, or two independent cointegration equations, depending on the evidence provided by any particular company. Empirical analysis on price discovery, based on a proprietary sample of North American and European firms, and tailored to the specific VECM at hand, indicates that stocks lead CDS and bonds more frequently than the other way round. It likewise confirms the leading role of CDS with respect to bonds.

We report simple regressions and Granger causality tests in order to understand the pattern of implied volatilities across exercise prices. We employ all calls and puts transacted between 16:00 and 16:45 on the Spanish IBEX-35 index from January 1994 to April 1996. Transaction costs, proxied by the bid–ask spread, seem to be a key determinant of the curvature of the volatility smile. Moreover, time to expiration, the uncertainty associated with the market and the relative market momentum are also important variables in explaining the smile.

This paper studies the impact of the banks’ portfolio holdings of financial derivatives on the banks’ individual contribution to systemic risk over and above the effect of variables related to size, interconnectedness, substitutability, and other balance sheet information. Using a sample of 95 U.S. bank holding companies from 2002 to 2011, we compare five measures of the banks’ contribution to systemic risk and find that the new measure proposed in this study, Net Shapley Value, outperforms the others. Using this measure we find that banks’ aggregate holdings of five classes of derivatives do not exhibit a significant effect on the bank’s contribution to systemic risk. On the contrary, the banks’ holdings of certain specific types of derivatives such as foreign exchange and credit derivatives increase the banks contributions to systemic risk whereas holdings of interest rate derivatives decrease it. Nevertheless, the proportion of non-performing loans over total loans and the leverage ratio have much stronger impact on systemic risk than derivatives holdings. Therefore, the derivatives’ impact plays a second fiddle in comparison with traditional banking activities related to the former two items.

This article proposes a new measure of tail risk spillover: the conditional coexceedance (CCX), defined as the number of joint occurrences of extreme negative returns in an industry, conditional on an extreme negative return in the financial sector. The empirical application provides evidence of significant volatility and tail risk spillovers from the financial sector to many real sectors in the U.S. economy from 2001 to 2011. These spillovers increase in crisis periods. The CCX in a given sector is positively related to its amount of debt financing and negatively related to its valuation and investment. Therefore, real economy sectors—which require relatively high debt financing and whose value and investment activity are relatively lower—are prime candidates for stock price volatility and depreciation in the wake of a financial sector crisis. Evidence also suggests that the higher the industry’s degree of competition, the stronger the tail risk spillover from the financial sector.