Smith [Smith, M., 1996. Shareholder activism by institutional investors: evidence from CALPERS. Journal of Finance 51, 227-252] and Wahal [Wahal, S., 1996. Public pension fund activism and firm performance. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 31, 1-23] identify significant positive abnormal returns surrounding the announcement of performance targetings by the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS), dubbed the “CalPERS effect.” More recent studies suggest that this “CalPERS effect” continues in later samples. While I confirm the early period results, I find the results reported in studies examining later periods are driven by the inclusion of early 1992–1993 targetings and from a significant bias in the market model parameters caused by estimation during periods of known under-performance. Additionally, these results are partially driven by the failure to control for contaminating events and the use unnecessarily long event windows. Contrary to previous studies, after addressing these methodological concerns, I find no evidence to support the continued existence of a “CalPERS effect”.

We examine the annual stock performance of firms that disclose the use of derivatives to hedge over the period 1995 to 1999. We find that only 21.6% of publicly traded U.S. corporations in our sample hedged with derivative instruments over this period and their use is concentrated in the larger companies. Similar to other studies we find that when derivatives are used, interest rate and currency securities are used much more frequently than commodity products. Our sample of 1308 companies that hedge outperforms other securities by 4.3% per year on average over our sample period. This result is robust to several alternative methods of estimating abnormal returns. When we segment performance by the type of hedge used, however, we find that the over-performance is due entirely to larger firms that hedge currency. We find no abnormal returns for firms hedging either interest rates or commodities. The abnormal returns in firms hedging currency is robust to alternative models that seek to control for exchange rate fluctuations and global equity returns; however, we find no significant abnormal returns to currency hedgers when using an augmented model that controls for the role of intangible assets.

This paper analyzes the process of private negotiations between financial institutions and the companies they attempt to influence. It relies on a private database consisting of the correspondence between TIAA-CREF and 45 firms it contacted about governance issues between 1992 and 1996. This correspondence indicates that TIAA-CREF is able to reach agreements with targeted companies more than 95 percent of the time. In more than 70 percent of the cases, this agreement is reached without shareholders voting on the proposal. We verify independently that at least 87 percent of the targets subsequently took actions to comply with these agreements.

This paper analyzes the process of private negotiations between financial institutions and the companies they attempt to influence. It relies on a private database consisting of the correspondence between TIAA‐CREF and 45 firms it contacted about governance issues between 1992 and 1996. This correspondence indicates that TIAA‐CREF is able to reach agreements with targeted companies more than 95 percent of the time. In more than 70 percent of the cases, this agreement is reached without shareholders voting on the proposal. We verify independently that at least 87 percent of the targets subsequently took actions to comply with these agreements.