Academic researchers, as well as pharmaceutical firms themselves, often use the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to estimate a firm's cost of capital. But the CAPM implicitly assumes that cash flows follow a random walk. This assumption is inconsistent with our finding that large U.S.-based pharmaceutical firms' cash flow growth rates display either momentum or mean-reversion. We show that growth rate momentum implies: (1) the systematic risk of a project increases monotonically with time to maturity of the cash flows; and (2) longer duration projects require a higher cost of capital. One of the practical implications of our results is that the traditional CAPM underestimates the cost of capital for some pharmaceutical firms by as much as 2.8%. These findings are quite relevant for the policy debate about the high rates of return earned by pharmaceutical companies, which some claim are pure rents and are not necessary to attract investors. Our theoretical and empirical analysis shows that high returns are often required to compensate for the higher systematic risk of long-duration pharmaceutical cash flows.

Introduction, 435. — Firm selection and data, 436. — Statistical methodology, 439. — Interpretation of data, 440. — Conclusion, 442. — Appendix A, 442. — Appendix B, 447. — Appendix C, 448.

This study investigates whether investors see through materially misstated earnings, and whether they anticipate earnings restatements. For firms that restate at least one annual report, we find that investors are misled by mistakes in reported earnings at the time of initial earnings announcements. Investors react positively to the component of the favorable earnings surprise that will subsequently be restated, and they attach the same valuation to it as to the true earnings surprise. We also find that investors anticipate the subsequent downward restatements and start marking stock prices down several months before a restatement announcement, so that the full impact of a restatement is about three times as large as the restatement announcement effect. Indeed, we show that investors punish restating firms because the stock price gains that shareholders enjoy when firms initially announce overstated earnings are more than reversed by the time of the restatement announcement.

Hospital quality measures are crucial to a key idea behind health care payment reforms: "paying for quality" instead of quantity. Nevertheless, such measures face major criticisms largely over the potential failure of risk adjustment to overcome endogeneity concerns when ranking hospitals. In this paper we test whether patients treated at hospitals that score higher on commonly-used quality measures have better health outcomes in terms of rehospitalization and mortality. To compare similar patients across hospitals in the same market, we exploit ambulance company preferences as an instrument for hospital choice. We find that a variety of measures used by insurers to measure provider quality are successful: choosing a high-quality hospital compared to a low-quality hospital results in 10-15% better outcomes.