This paper presents a theory to explain the economic value of tranching and provides empirical evidence to support the theoretical implications. I show that riskier firms are more likely to take loans with multiple tranches. Therefore, the average credit spread on a syndicated loan with multiple tranches is higher than that on a non-tranched loan. However, after accounting for the risk characteristics of a tranched loan, I show that borrowings that are a part of tranched loans have lower credit spreads than otherwise identical non-tranched loans. I also show that the benefits of tranching accrue primarily to riskier borrowers.

This paper investigates whether there are systematic differences between the forecasting style and abilities of female and male analysts, and whether market participants recognize these differences. My key conjecture is that only female analysts with superior forecasting abilities enter the profession due to a perception of discrimination in the analyst labor market. Consistent with this conjecture, I find that female analysts issue bolder and more accurate forecasts and their accuracy is higher in market segments in which their concentration is lower. Further, the stock market participants are aware of the male–female skill differences. They respond more strongly to the forecast revisions by female analysts even though those analysts get less media coverage. The short‐term market reaction is incomplete, however, because it is followed by a strong post‐revision drift. The perception of abilities is similar in the analyst labor market, where female analysts are more likely to move up to high‐status brokerage firms, while their downward career mobility is lower. Collectively, these results indicate that female analysts have better‐than‐average skill due to self‐selection and market participants are at least partially able to recognize their superior abilities.

[Based on an analysis of the agency risk for bondholders from managerial entrenchment and fraud, we derive and test refutable hypotheses about the influence of managerial agency risk on bond covenants, using a comprehensive database of corporate bonds from the 1993-2007 period. Managerial entrenchment and the risk of managerial fraud significantly influence the use of covenants, in the direction predicted by the agencytheoretic framework. Our analysis highlights the varied effects of entrenchment on different types of agency risks faced by bondholders: Entrenched managers aggravate investment risk, but ameliorate risk from shareholder opportunism. Covenant use also responds efficiently to the quality of information available regarding the risk of managerial fraud.]

[Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) document a positive trend in idiosyncratic volatility during the 1962-1997 period. We show that by 2003 volatility falls back to pre-1990s levels. Furthermore, we show that the increase and subsequent reversal is concentrated among firms with low stock prices and high retail ownership. This evidence suggests that the increase in idiosyncratic volatility through the 1990s was not a time trend but, rather, an episodic phenomenon, at least partially associated with retail investors. Results from cross-sectional regressions, conditional trend estimation, stock-split events, and "attentiongrabbing" events are consistent with a retail trading effect.]

Based on an analysis of the agency risk for bondholders from managerial entrenchment and fraud, we derive and test refutable hypotheses about the influence of managerial agency risk on bond covenants, using a comprehensive database of corporate bonds from the 1993–2007 period. Managerial entrenchment and the risk of managerial fraud significantly influence the use of covenants, in the direction predicted by the agency-theoretic framework. Our analysis highlights the varied effects of entrenchment on different types of agency risks faced by bondholders: Entrenched managers aggravate investment risk, but ameliorate risk from shareholder opportunism. Covenant use also responds efficiently to the quality of information available regarding the risk of managerial fraud.

Campbell, Lettau, Malkiel, and Xu (2001) document a positive trend in idiosyncratic volatility during the 1962–1997 period. We show that by 2003 volatility falls back to pre-1990s levels. Furthermore, we show that the increase and subsequent reversal is concentrated among firms with low stock prices and high retail ownership. This evidence suggests that the increase in idiosyncratic volatility through the 1990s was not a time trend but, rather, an episodic phenomenon, at least partially associated with retail investors. Results from cross-sectional regressions, conditional trend estimation, stock-split events, and “attention-grabbing” events are consistent with a retail trading effect.