Previous studies show that in contrast to evidence that share issue privatization (SIP) in most other countries have improved firm profitability, China’s SIP of the 1990s had no such effect. We argue that the main reason for the failure of China’s SIP is likely to have been the weak institutional environment in place at that time. We examine China’s SIP in a more recent period in which the institutional environment was greatly improved. Using a matching sample method, we find that SIP firms continued to experience negative post-SIP profitability changes in our sample period. However, their performance decline was significantly less than that of their matched non-SIP SOEs. We also find that the introduction of the independent director rule helped to improve firm performance. Our results reconcile the findings of the SIP effect in China with international evidence and illustrate the importance of a developed capital market to ensuring the success of privatization schemes.

We investigate the role of national culture in corporate risk-taking. We postulate that culture influences corporate risk-taking both through its effect on managerial decision-making and through its effect on a country's formal institutions. Further, we postulate that the influence of culture is conditioned on the extent of managerial discretion as measured by earnings discretion and firm size. Using firm-level data from 35 countries and employing a hierarchical linear modeling approach to isolate the effects of firm-level and country-level variables, we show that individualism has a positive and significant association, whereas uncertainty avoidance and harmony have negative and significant associations, with corporate risk-taking. Greater earnings discretion strengthens and larger firm size weakens the association of culture with corporate risk-taking. We conclude that even in a highly globalized world with sophisticated managers, culture matters.