This paper develops a game‐theoretic model that endogenizes the items included in the bargaining agenda. The model's equilibria suggest two possible sources of inefficiency: (1) exclusion of items from the bargaining agenda and (2) delay to agreement due to negotiations over the bargaining agenda. Evidence from union contract negotiations is provided to demonstrate the relevance of these sources of inefficiency. The model also allows strategic delegation by the union. In certain equilibria, the surplus‐maximizing union selects wage‐maximizing delegates (such as senior union members) to negotiate the contract.

This paper explores a group rule–utilitarian approach to understanding voter turnout, inspired by the theoretical work of John C. Harsanyi (1980) and Timothy J. Feddersen and Alvaro Sandroni (2002). It develops a model based on this approach and studies its performance in explaining turnout in Texas liquor referenda. The results are encouraging: the comparative static predictions of the model are broadly consistent with the data, and a structurally estimated version of the model yields reasonable coefficient estimates and fits the data well. The structurally estimated model also outperforms a simple expressive voting model.

To control the deer population, state game commissions regulate the types of deer that can be legally harvested. These regulations, however, might have an unintended effect on hunting-related accidents by changing the care hunters take when firing their rifles—a moral hazard effect—or changing the composition of hunters. Using detailed data on hunting accidents and regulations in Pennsylvania counties from 1990 to 2005, we find compelling evidence that harvesting restrictions increase the care hunters take in a manner consistent with moral hazard. Thus, these regulations have a positive safety externality.

This paper empirically tests for a multidimensional separating equilibrium in contract negotiations and tests for evidence of the moral hazard inherent in many contracts. Using contract and performance data on players drafted into the National Football League from 1986 through 1991, we find evidence that players use delay to agreement and incentive clauses to reveal their private information during contract negotiations. In addition, our empirical tests of the moral hazard issue indicate that a player's effort level is influenced by the structure of his contract.

Evidence suggests that people understand qualitatively how tastes change over time, but underestimate the magnitudes. This evidence is limited, however, to laboratory evidence or surveys of reported happiness. We test for such projection bias in field data. Using data on catalog orders of cold-weather items, we find evidence of projection bias over the weather—specifically, people's decisions are overinfluenced by the current weather. Our estimates suggest that if the order-date temperature declines by 30°F, the return probability increases by 3.95 percent. We also estimate a structural model to measure the magnitude of the bias. (JEL D12, L81)