Against the background of the current debate about fiscal sustainability in several advanced economies, this paper estimates determinants of G7 sovereign bond spreads, using high-frequency proxies for market expectations about macroeconomic fundamentals and allowing for time-varying parameters. The paper finds substantial asymmetry in the importance of country fundamentals and considerable time variations in the pricing of risks. There has been a reduced pricing of several risk factors in the years preceding the financial crisis, and either an over-pricing of risk or the pricing of a re-denomination risk of euro area bonds during the European sovereign debt crisis, a pattern that does not apply to the non-euro area G7 bonds.

The end result of major sporting events has been shown to affect next day stock returns through shifts in investor mood. By studying intraday data during the soccer matches that led to the elimination of France and Italy from the 2010 FIFA World Cup, we test whether mood-related pricing effects already materialize as events unfold. We use data for a cross-listed firm, which allows for a straightforward identification of underpricing. During the matches, the firm’s stock is underpriced by up to 7 basis points in the country that eventually loses. The probability of underpricing increases as elimination becomes more likely.

How and why do politicians' preferences about monetary policy differ from the interest rates set by independent central banks? Looking at the European Central Bank (ECB), this paper shows that politicians, on average, favor significantly lower interest rates. Three factors explain the different preferences. First, politicians put relatively less weight on inflation (and more on output) in their preferred monetary policy reaction function. Second, their preferences are affected by political economy motives. Third, different preferences are also, and largely, due to different constituencies, as politicians primarily focus on national economic objectives rather than the euro area as a whole.

Central banks are increasingly reaching out to the general public to motivate and explain their monetary policy actions. One major aim of this outreach is to ensure accountability and create trust; another is to guide inflation expectations. This article surveys a rapidly growing literature on central bank communication with the public, rather than with the financial markets. We first discuss why such communication matters and is more challenging than communicating with expert audiences. Then we turn to methods: How do central banks try to reach the public, and do they succeed? Next, and importantly, we survey the empirical evidence on the extent to which this new outreach affects inflation expectations. On balance, we see some promise in the potential to inform the public better, but many challenges along the way.

Over the last two decades, communication has become an increasingly important aspect of monetary policy. These real-world developments have spawned a huge new scholarly literature on central bank communication—mostly empirical, and almost all of it written in this decade. We survey this ever-growing literature. The evidence suggests that communication can be an important and powerful part of the central bank's toolkit since it has the ability to move financial markets, to enhance the predictability of monetary policy decisions, and potentially to help achieve central banks' macroeconomic objectives. However, the large variation in communication strategies across central banks suggests that a consensus has yet to emerge on what constitutes an optimal communication strategy.

We analyze the transmission of the 2007 to 2009 financial crisis to 415 country‐industry equity portfolios. We use a factor model to predict crisis returns, defining unexplained increases in factor loadings and residual correlations as indicative of contagion. While we find evidence of contagion from the United States and the global financial sector, the effects are small. By contrast, there has been substantial contagion from domestic markets to individual domestic portfolios, with its severity inversely related to the quality of countries’ economic fundamentals. This confirms the “wake‐up call” hypothesis, with markets focusing more on country‐specific characteristics during the crisis.