The annualized interest rate for a payday loan often exceeds 10 times that of a typical credit card, yet this market grew immensely in the 1990s and 2000s, elevating concerns about the risk payday loans pose to consumers and whether payday lenders target minority neighborhoods. This paper employs individual credit record data, and Census data on payday lender store locations, to assess these concerns. Taking advantage of several state law changes since 2006 and, following previous work, within-state-year differences in access arising from proximity to states that allow payday loans, I find little to no effect of payday loans on credit scores, new delinquencies, or the likelihood of overdrawing credit lines. The analysis also indicates that neighborhood racial composition has little influence on payday lender store locations conditional on income, wealth and demographic characteristics.

We test for racial discrimination in the prices charged by mortgage lenders. We construct a unique data set from which we observe the three dimensions of a mortgage’s price: the interest rate, discount points, and fees. Although we find statistically significant gaps by race and ethnicity in interest rates, these gaps are offset by differences in discount points. We trace out point-rate schedules and show that minorities and whites face identical schedules, but sort to different locations on the schedule. Such sorting may reflect systematic differences in liquidity or preferences. Finally, we find no differences in total fees by race or ethnicity.

We provide novel evidence of misaligned incentives fueling a portion of the 2000s mortgage boom. We document that private mortgage insurance (PMI) companies expanded insurance issuance on high-risk mortgages purchased by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac at the tail end of the housing boom, without changing pricing and despite knowledge of heightened housing risk. The expansion of PMI facilitated an unprecedented increase in Fannie and Freddie’s risky purchases, extending the mortgage boom into 2007 and precipitating their collapse. We argue that this unraveling reflects a general moral hazard problem in insurance, coupled with misaligned incentives in the government-backed mortgage market.

Credit record panel data from 1999–2010 indicates that the likelihood of home equity extraction (borrowing, on average, about $40,000 against one's home) peaked in 2003 when mortgage rates reached historic lows. We estimate a 27 percent rise in extraction in response to a 100 basis point rate decline, and that house price growth amplifies this relationship. Differential responses to interest rates and home price appreciation by borrower age and credit score provide new evidence of financial frictions. Finally, equity extractions are associated with higher default risk, consistent with the use of borrowed funds for consumption or illiquid investment. (JEL D14, E43, E52, G12, R31)

ABSTRACT Comparing mortgage rates that borrowers obtain to rates that lenders could offer for the same loan, we find that many homeowners significantly overpay for their mortgage, with overpayment varying across borrower types and with market interest rates. Survey data reveal that borrowers' mortgage knowledge and shopping behavior strongly correlate with the rates they secure. We also document substantial variation in how expensive and profitable lenders are, without any evidence that expensive loans are associated with a better borrower experience. Despite many lenders operating in the U.S. mortgage market, limited borrower sophistication may provide lenders with market power.

ABSTRACT We assess racial discrimination in mortgage approvals using confidential data on mortgage applications. Minority applicants tend to have lower credit scores and higher leverage, and are less likely to receive algorithmic approval from race‐blind automated underwriting systems (AUS). Observable applicant‐risk factors explain most of the racial disparities in lender denials. Further, exploiting the AUS data, we show there are risk factors we do not observe, and these factors at least partially explain the residual 1 to 2 percentage point denial gaps. We conclude that differential treatment plays a more limited role in generating denial disparities than previous research suggests.

ABSTRACT From 2007 to 2009 U.S. house prices plunged and mortgage defaults surged. While ostensibly consistent with widespread “ruthless default,” analysis of detailed mortgage and house price data indicates that borrowers do not walk away until they are deeply underwater—far deeper than traditional models predict. The evidence suggests that lender recourse is not the major driver of this result. We argue that emotional and behavioral factors play an important role in decisions to continue paying. Borrower reluctance to walk away implies that the moral hazard cost of default as a form of social insurance may be lower than suspected.