This paper uses a methodology robust to recent criticisms of standard long-horizon event study tests to show that bidders in mergers underperform while bidders in tender offers overperform in the three years after the acquisition. However, the long-term underperformance of acquiring firms in mergers is predominantly caused by the poor post-acquisition performance of low book-to-market “glamour” firms. We interpret this finding as evidence that both the market and the management overextrapolate the bidder's past performance (as reflected in the bidder's book-to-market ratio) when they assess the desirability of an acquisition.

Preferential trading arrangements are analyzed from the viewpoint of the “new political economy” that views trade policy as being determined by lobbying of concentrated interest groups. Two conclusions are reached: first, that trade-diverting preferential arrangements are more likely to be supported politically; and second, that such preferential arrangements could critically change domestic incentives so multilateral liberalization that is initially politically feasible could be rendered infeasible by a preferential arrangement. The larger the trade diversion resulting from the preferential arrangement, the more likely this will be the case.

Salesperson and executive compensation contracts typically specify a nonlinear relationship between firm revenues and pay. These agents therefore have incentive to manipulate prices, influence the timing of customer purchases, and vary effort over their firms' fiscal years. This paper empirically establishes results consistent with agents' focusing on performance over the fiscal year. Most notably, in addition to varying with the calendar business cycle, manufacturing firms' sales are higher at the end of the fiscal year, and lower at the beginning, than they are in the middle. Further evidence is found in fiscal-year price movements and patterns in the industry variation of fiscal-year effects.

Since technological change influences the rate at which human capital obsolesces and also increases the uncertainty associated with human capital investments, training may increase or decrease at higher rates of technological change. Using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, we find that production workers in manufacturing industries with higher rates of technological change are more likely to receive formal company training. At higher rates of technological change, the training gap between the more and less educated narrows, low‐skilled nonproduction workers receive significantly more training than higher‐skilled nonproduction workers, and the proportion of individuals receiving training increases.

This article is based on the premise that the primary goal of a critical discussion in the accounting standard setting due process should be to reach conclusions by means of reasoned arguments. A normative model for achieving this goal is applied to some arguments made in recent accounting standard setting debates in the U.S. The model consists of eight maxims for advancing and defending arguments in a critical discussion in general and five presuppositions for a critical discussion about external financial reporting topics in particular. The normative model provides criteria for evaluating the validity of arguments, but it also is recognized that like all other language games the model does not (and cannot) carry within itself its own legitimation. The article concludes by considering how the standard setting debates can yield not only technical accounting outcomes but also changes in the nature of due process itself.

Equity finance, raised through a rights issue, is a popular method for funding acquisitions in UK. Acquisitions are often contingent on a number of external factors. This paper uses a binomial asset pricing model to examine the effects on the share price of a company that undertakes an equity rights issue to fund a contingent acquisition. We consider a new equity rights issue instrument called a non-interest bearing convertible unsecured loan stock (NICULS), specifically designed to deal with contingent acquisitions. We develop our model in two stages. First, we assume perfect foresight on behalf of the issuing company and investors and, secondly, we develop a model that relaxes these restrictive assumptions, called a NICULS model. Our preliminary findings based on a case study show that there is a dip in the share price over and above that expected by the dilution effect of the increased number of shares. We interpret this either as a natural consequence of the market's evaluation of the value of the investments for which the funds were raised or as a signal imparted by the company about the future investment opportunities of the company. We have also found that the market's expectation of the success of the acquisition attempt has a direct and significant effect on the observed dip in the share price.