A MONG THE BIG unsettled questions of modrem history and economic history, four loom large-the industrial revolution, the French revolution, the German inflation of the 1920s, and the world depression of the 1930s. All are still studied, debated giving rise to many theories, mostly mono-causal and conflicting. More unsettled questions may be on the way, for example the inflation of the 1980s and the stagnation of the early 1990s. But Gerald Feldman has written a big book that must be taken into account in any discussion of the German inflation, big in many senses, 1000 pages of double-column print (triple columns in the index), 4.48 pounds in weight at my local supermarket, and covering in the order of the subtitle the politics, economics, and sociology of this pathological episode. Specialists in any one discipline may find their own discipline relatively neglected, especially economists who tend to want more theory, as D. C. Coleman indicates, who asserts that theories are what economists make, while historians need evidence (1969, p. 8). The evidence here is prodigious: 49 tables, two-thirds that number of photographs and illustrations, 85 pages of endnotes, 24 pages of bibliography, and a 42-page index, the work of 15 years of study of the subject and 43 earlier publications of Feldman-books, articles, and edited work, some with colleagues, mostly his own. The feast is rich; some economists and economic historians may find it too rich for ready digestion. Feldman is aware of his problem in combining contradictory modes of analysis, but believes it necessary. Partly in a reaction to the work of Carl-Ludwig Holtfrerich whose The German Inflation, 1914-1923 (1986) concludes that the results of the inflation on balance were favorable in giving Germany years of investment and full employment in a largely depressed world and ridding it of private foreign and all internal debt, he asserts:

Abstract We study human capital reallocation following firm-specific idiosyncratic shocks. We analyze relegation battles in the English Premier League, a setting that offers well-identified idiosyncratic shocks as well as both individual-level and firm-level productivity metrics. Following a negative idiosyncratic shock, we find that relatively more productive players move to more productive clubs and maintain their long-term productivity. They get replaced with lower productivity players. Overall, our results show that in a setting with highly transferable and observable skills, idiosyncratic shocks lead to a reallocation of human capital that moves the industry toward a better overall match between individual-level and firm-level productivity. (JEL G31, G32, G33, J24)

Abstract I document that the network structure of the online economy significantly contributes to rising industry concentration. Firms that are central in the online economy benefit more from increased economies of scale, decreased search costs, and network effects resulting from digitalization. Industries with firms that are more central become more concentrated and central firms have larger increases in market share. These results are driven by firms’ ability to generate revenue, as evidenced by central firms earning higher risk-adjusted returns and having more positive earnings surprises. Centrality is also associated with increasing productivity, but profitability only increases for central firms in business-to-consumer industries.

This paper introduces two methods of hiding loan losses and analyzes how they affect a bank's loan interest income, payments on deposits, liquidity and moral hazard. The analysis reveals that a hiding method represents a Ponzi scheme. Contrary to classic theory, e.g. Diamond (1984), moral hazard may arise even though a bank's loan portfolio is diversified. Alternative instruments to eliminate hiding are investigated. Under specific circumstances, a Ponzi scheme may provide a socially optimal method to create liquidity and prevent a failure of a solvent but illiquid bank.

In the dynamic model of banking, a bank's option to hide its loan losses by rolling over non-performing loans is shown to worsen moral hazard. Contrary to the classic theory, moral hazard may arise even when a bank cannot seek a correlated risk for its loans. The loans seem to be performing and the bank makes a profit although it is de facto insolvent. When the bank's balance sheet includes hidden non-performing loans, the bank may optimally shrink lending or gamble for resurrection by growing aggressively. To eliminate this type of moral hazard, which is broadly consistent with evidence from emerging economies, a few regulatory implications are suggested.

Abstract We examine the role of race and racial concordance between financial advisors and their local community. We document significant differences in stock market participation based on community racial composition, as well as differences in the characteristics of communities served by minority advisors. Notably, minority advisors are more likely to serve racially concordant communities, which tend to be poorer. We find that racial concordance has only a modest relation with local stock market participation. However, while minority advisors are more likely to leave the industry, this relation is mitigated among advisors located in more concordant communities. (JEL G20, G50, D14, J15)

Abstract This paper studies the extent to which macro-finance term structure models are susceptible to predictive uncertainty. We propose a general form of arbitrage-free models and quantify the relative importance of unpredictable priced risk variance, as well as macro-finance model uncertainty and learning uncertainty in predictability. Predictive performance and relative contributions of uncertainty sources are dynamically measured based on Bayesian methods, revealing dominating priced risk variance and other important uncertainty sources at different points in time. Macro-finance model uncertainty is high for near-term forward spread forecasts and contributes up to 87% of predictive uncertainty prior to recessions, implying strong dispersion in the information content of macro variables when forming near-term monetary policy expectations. (JEL C1, C3, C5, D8, E4, G1)

I provide evidence that loan loss accounting affects procyclical lending through its impact on regulatory actions. Regulators are more likely to place banks with inadequate loan loss allowances under enforcement actions that restrict lending, leading these banks to lend less during downturns. Further, I find that banks with lower regulatory ratings lend less when they have more timely provisions, consistent with research theorizing that timely provisions increase transparency and inhibit regulatory forbearance. This regulatory action mechanism expands on prior research that has focused on the effect of loan loss recognition on regulatory capital adequacy during economic downturns.