In a field experiment, we examine the impact of performance-based incentives for community college instructors. Instructor incentives improve student exam scores, course grades, and credit accumulation while reducing course dropout. Effects are largest among part-time adjunct instructors. During the program, instructor incentives have large positive spillovers, increasing completion rates and grades in students’ courses outside our study. One year after the program, instructor incentives increase transfer rates to 4-year colleges with no impact on 2-year college degrees. We find no evidence of complementarities between instructor incentives and student incentives. Finally, while instructors initially prefer gain-framed contracts over our loss-framed ones, preferences for loss-framed contracts significantly increase after experience with them.

We conduct field experiments to investigate dynamic inconsistency and commitment demand in food choice. In two home grocery delivery programs, we document substantial dynamic inconsistency between advance and immediate choices. When given the option to commit to their advance choices, around half of subjects take it up. Commitment demand is negatively correlated with dynamic inconsistency, suggesting those with larger self-control problems are less likely to be aware thereof. We evaluate the welfare consequences of dynamic inconsistency and commitment policies with utility measures based on advance, immediate, and unambiguous choices. Simply offering commitment has limited welfare (and behavioural) consequences under all measures.

Although backward induction is a cornerstone of game theory, most laboratory experiments have found that agents are not able to successfully backward induct. We analyze the play of world-class chess players in the centipede game, which is ill-suited for testing backward induction, and in pure backward induction games—Race to 100 games. We find that chess players almost never play the backward induction equilibrium in the centipede game, but many properly backward induct in the Race to 100 games. We find no systematic within-subject relationship between choices in the centipede game and performance in pure backward induction games.