In an economy where fiat money serves both as a medium of exchange and the means by which debts are cleared, it is shown that nonoptimal equilibria of constrained liquidity may arise. Optimality may be restored by temporary expansions of the monetary base (e.g., an active central-bank "discount window").

The paper offers a theory of income differences in which income inequality exists and persists despite identical tastes and talents. Teams of unskilled labor supervised by schooled managers produce goods with increasing returns to scale. Agents are assumed unable to borrow to fund the human capital investment needed to become managers. Despite ex ante identical agents, the model displays the following equilibrium phenomena: (i) risk-averse agents accept fair gambles, implying an unequal ex post distribution of unearned income; (ii) agents agree to publicly subsidize education, although those receiving the subsidy have the highest material wealth; and (iii) income and educational differences are perpetuated from generation to generation.

This paper presents a model of finitely lived rational agents in which unanticipated innovations in the stock of fiat money affect real variables. An unanticipated inflation reduces the real value of the nominally denominated national debt, thereby reducing the crowding-out of capital and/or the tax burden. Both effects stimulate increased investment in capital, which leads to an increase in real output and wages in the following periods. In contrast with price-surprise models, these real effects occur even if the monetary innovation is instantly and perfectly observed by agents.

The paper offers a theory of income differences in which income inequality exists and persists despite identical tastes and talents. Teams of unskilled labor supervised by schooled managers produce goods with increasing returns to scale. Agents are assumed unable to borrow to fund the human capital investment needed to become managers. Despite ex ante identical agents, the model displays the following equilibrium phenomena: (i) risk-averse agents accept fair gambles, implying an unequal ex post distribution of unearned income; (ii) agents agree to publicly subsidize education, although those receiving the subsidy have the highest material wealth; and (iii) income and educational differences are perpetuated from generation to generation.

This paper presents a model of finitely lived rational agents in which unanticipated innovations in the stock of fiat money affect real variables. An unanticipated inflation reduces the real value of the nominally denominated national debt, thereby reducing the crowding-out of capital and/or the tax burden. Both effects stimulate increased investment in capital, which leads to an increase in real output and wages in the following periods. In contrast with price-surprise models, these real effects occur even if the monetary innovation is instantly and perfectly observed by agents. Copyright 1990 by American Economic Association.

We ask whether the following observations may result from endogenously determined fluctuations in the money multiplier rather than a causal influence of money on output: (i) M1 is positively correlated with real output; (ii) the money multiplier and deposit-to-currency ratio are positively correlated with output; (iii) the price level is negatively correlated with output; (iv) the correlation of M1 with contemporaneous prices is substantially weaker than the correlation of M1 with real output; (v) correlations among real variables are essentially unchanged under different monetary-policy regimes; and (vi) real money balances are smoother than money-demand equations would predict. (JEL E300, E510)