In recent years, mergers, acquisitions and organic growth have meant that some of the largest and most complex financial groups have come to transcend national boundaries and traditionally defined business-lines. As a result, they have become a potential channel for the cross-border and cross-market transmission of financial shocks. This paper analyses the degree of comovement in the equity prices of a selected group of large complex financial institutions (LCFIs), and assesses the extent to which movements are driven by common factors. A relatively high degree of commonality is found for most LCFIs although there are still noticeable divisions between sub-groups of LCFIs, both according to geography and to a lesser extent primary business-line.

Abstract This paper analyzes the relation between agency conflicts and risk management. In contrast to previous contributions, our analysis incorporates not only stockholder-debtholder conflicts but also manager–stockholder conflicts. We show that the costs of both underinvestment and overinvestment are essential in determining the firm's hedging policy. In particular, firms that derive more of their value from assets in place (lower market-to-book ratios), although having lower costs of underinvestment, generally display larger costs of overinvestment. Thus, they may be more likely to hedge to control these overinvestment incentives. Our analysis explains why large profitable firms with fewer growth opportunities tend to hedge more (Bartram et al., 2004). It also provides a number of new predictions relating the benefits associated with risk management to various dimensions of the firm's economic environment.

When the quality of a good is at the discretion of the seller, how can buyers assure that the seller provides the mutually efficient level of quality? Contracts that provide a bonus to the seller if the quality is acceptable or impose a penalty on the seller if quality is unacceptable can, in theory, provide efficient incentives. But how are such contracts enforced? While the courts can be used, doing so involves high real costs. Informal enforcement, involving a loss of reputation and future access to the market for any party that defaults on a contract, may often be a better alternative. This paper explores the use of both formal and informal enforcement mechanisms, provides a rationale for a variety of observed market mechanisms, and then generates a number of testable hypotheses.

Using confidential microdata from the Characteristics of Business Owners survey, we examine why African American–owned businesses lag substantially behind white‐owned businesses in sales, profits, employment, and survival. Black business owners are much less likely than white owners to have had a self‐employed family member owner prior to starting their business and less likely to have worked in that family member’s business. Using a nonlinear decomposition technique, we find that the lack of prior work experience in a family business among black business owners, perhaps by limiting their acquisition of general and specific business human capital, negatively affects black business outcomes.

A company officer is an "alumnus" if he previously worked for an audit firm. Iyer, Bamber, and Barefield (1997) find that alumni have ties with their former audit firms and alumni are more inclined to provide economic benefits to former firms if they have stronger ties. If the alumnus is a senior corporate officer, the alumnus may benefit his former firm by recommending that the company appoint the firm as its auditor. However, the company's audit committee may be concerned that officer-auditor ties threaten audit quality. Therefore, an independent audit committee may not sanction the appointment of the officer's former firm. This study investigates (a) whether companies tend to appoint officers' former audit firms, and (b) whether independent audit committees mitigate this tendency. We document that companies appoint officers' former firms more often than they appoint alternative audit firms. However, companies are less likely to appoint officers' former firms if audit committees are more independent. This suggests that independent audit committees strengthen audit quality by deterring affiliations between audit firms and officers. © CAAA.

We use internal control deficiency (ICD) disclosures prior to mandated internal control audits to investigate economic factors that expose firms to control failures and managements’ incentives to discover and report control problems. We find that, relative to non-disclosers, firms disclosing ICDs have more complex operations, recent organizational changes, greater accounting risk, more auditor resignations and have fewer resources available for internal control. Regarding incentives to discover and report internal control problems, ICD firms have more prior SEC enforcement actions and financial restatements, are more likely to use a dominant audit firm, and have more concentrated institutional ownership.

ABSTRACT This paper examines interpretation of accounting standards that provide implementation guidance via affirmative or counter examples. Based on prior psychology research, we predict that practitioners engage in “example‐based reasoning” such that they are more likely to conclude that their case qualifies for the same treatment as the example. We test our predictions in two experiments in which participants judge the appropriateness of income‐statement recognition. Experiment 1 uses Masters of Business Administration (MBA) students and varies example type (affirmative, counter) and case (revenue recognition, expense recognition) in a 2 × 2 design. Experiment 1 supports our predictions. Experiment 2 uses more experienced practitioners, and varies example type (affirmative, counter, both) in a 1 × 3 design. Experiment 2 supports the use of example‐based reasoning, and indicates that practitioners in the “both” condition respond as if they had only received an affirmative example. These results have implications for understanding how guidance that accompanies accounting standards can result in aggressive or conservative application of standards.

This paper discusses the nature, and magnitude, of externalities associated with automobile use, including local and global pollution, oil dependence, traffic congestion and traffic accidents. It then discusses current federal policies affecting these externalities, including fuel taxes, fuel economy and emissions standards, and alternative fuel policies, summarizing, insofar as possible, the welfare effects of those policies. Finally, we discuss emerging pricing policies, including congestion tolls, and insurance reform, and summarize the appropriate combination of policies to address automobile externalities.