Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract This paper uses the residual income valuation technique outlined in Feltham and Ohlson 1996 to examine the relation between stock valuations and accounting numbers for a prototypical banking firm. Prior work of this nature typically assumes a manufacturing setting. This paper contributes to the prior research by clarifying how the approach can be extended to settings where value is created from financial assets and liabilities. Key elements of our model include allowing banks to generate positive net present value from either lending or borrowing activities, and allowing for accounting policy to affect valuation through the loan loss allowance. We validate our model using archival data analysis, and interpret coefficients in light of our modeling assumptions. These results suggest that banks create value more from deposit‐taking activities than from lending activities. Vuong tests confirm that our model outperforms adaptations of the unbiased accounting model of Ohlson 1995 and adaptations of the base model proposed by Beaver, Eger, Ryan, and Wolfson 1989. However, our model is outperformed by the popular net income‐book value model used in many empirical studies, and we can formally reject one of our key modeling assumptions. These tests of our model suggest future avenues for improving upon the theoretical analysis.

Abstract Prior research using the residual income valuation model and linear information models has generally found that estimates of firm value are negatively biased. We argue that this could result from the way in which accounting conservatism effects are reflected in such models. We build on the conservative accounting model of Feltham and Ohlson 1995 and the Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan 1999 (DHS) methodology to propose a valuation model that includes a conservatism‐correction term, based on the properties of past realizations of residual income and “other information”. “Other information” is measured using analyst‐forecast‐based predictions of residual income. We use data comparable to the DHS sample to compare the bias and inaccuracy of value estimates from our model and from models similar to those used by DHS and Myers 1999. Valuation biases are substantially less negative for our model, but valuation inaccuracy is not markedly reduced.

Abstract This paper solves a model that links earnings quality to the equity risk premium in an infinite‐horizon consumption capital asset pricing model (CAPM) economy. In the model, risk‐averse traders hold diversified portfolios consisting of risk‐free bonds and shares of many risky firms. When constructing their portfolios, traders rely on noisy reported earnings and dividend payments for information about the risky firms. The main new element of the model is an explicit representation of earnings quality that includes hidden accrual errors that reverse in subsequent periods. The model demonstrates that earnings quality magnifies fundamental risk. Absent fundamental risk, poor earnings quality cannot affect the equity risk premium. Moreover, only the systematic (undiversified) component of earnings‐quality risk contributes to the equity risk premium. In contrast, all components of earnings‐quality risk affect earnings capitalization factors. The model ties together consumption CAPM and accounting‐based valuation research into one price formula linking earnings quality to the equity risk premium and earnings capitalization factors.

Be honest to those who are honest, and be honest to those who are not honest.

Abstract This paper examines whether firms that voluntarily recognize stock option expense in their financial statements manage that expense downward more than firms that do not recognize the expense by adjusting option‐pricing model assumptions. To examine this issue, I collect option‐pricing model assumptions from fiscal year 2002 for both a sample of firms that voluntarily recognize stock option expense (“recognizing firms”) and a sample of control firms that do not (“disclosing firms”). The empirical results suggest that recognizing firms manage the recognized stock‐based compensation expense reported in their financial statements downward more than do firms that only disclose the expense. Additional analyses reveal that recognizing firms assume a lower level of volatility than disclosing firms in the option‐pricing model calculations; however, I find no evidence that recognizing firms manage the dividend yield and risk‐free interest rate assumptions more than disclosing firms. The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) recently issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123(R), which requires the expensing of the fair value of stock options, so these results may be of interest to capital‐market participants and the FASB as they assess the reliability of stock option expense as determined by option‐pricing models.

Abstract Two standard‐setting approaches have emerged globally to guide the choice of accounting for securitizations: the control and components approach ( SFAS No. 125 and SFAS No. 140 ) and the risks and rewards transfer approach ( IAS No. 39 ). A lack of consensus about derecognition accounting is a major impediment to achieving convergence in global standards that must be resolved. Thus, both SFAS No. 140 and IAS No. 39 will be reexamined, and evidence pertinent to the debate is timely and important. In this study, we present evidence consistent with the view of credit‐rating analysts, who view many securitizations as, in substance, secured borrowings. Specifically, for a sample of originators applying sale accounting guidance in SFAS No. 125 / 140 during the period 1997‐2003, we show that off‐balance‐sheet debt related to securitizations has, on average, the same risk‐relevance for explaining market measures of risk (that is, CAPM beta) as on‐balance‐sheet debt. We also find that, in a returns and earnings association framework, the pricing multiple on securitization gains declines as the amount of off‐balance‐sheet debt increases, implying that investors take off‐balance‐sheet debt into account when assessing the valuation‐relevance of such gains. For those who advocate the control and components approach to securitization accounting, our results suggest that, at least for frequent securitizers, the put option arising from implicit recourse is a “missing piece” that is not currently accounted for when calculating securitization gains. Our results challenge the extant measurement standards in SFAS No. 140 .

Abstract Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 130: Reporting Comprehensive Income encourages enterprises to report comprehensive income on a performance statement rather than on a statement of equity. We investigate the reporting decisions of 82 publicly traded property‐liability insurers that are fairly evenly split in their choice. Our results demonstrate that insurers with a tendency to manage earnings through realized securities' gains and losses (that is, cherry pickers), as well as insurers with a reputation for poor disclosure quality, are more likely to report comprehensive income in a statement of equity. Apparently, these insurers face the highest cost of transparency. We do not find a relation between the reporting decision and the volatility of comprehensive income relative to the volatility of net income. Our findings that insurers' comprehensive income reporting choices are a reflection of their proclivity toward cherry picking as well as their level of disclosure quality should be of interest to standard‐setters because of the controversy over standard‐setters' preference for mandating all firms to report comprehensive income in a performance statement.

Abstract The accruals anomaly — the negative relationship between accounting accruals and subsequent stock returns — has been well documented in the academic and practitioner literatures for almost a decade. To the extent that this anomaly represents market inefficiency, one would expect sophisticated investors to learn about it and arbitrage the anomaly away. We show that the accruals anomaly still persists and, even more strikingly, its magnitude has not declined over time. How can this be explained? We show that the accruals anomaly is recognized and, indeed, exploited by certain active institutional investors, but the magnitude of this accruals‐related trading is rather small. By and large, institutions shy away from extreme‐accruals firms because their attributes, such as small size, low profitability, and high risk stand in stark contrast to those preferred by most institutions. Individual investors are also, by and large, unable to profit from trading on accruals information due to the high information and transaction costs associated with implementing a consistently profitable accruals strategy. Consequently, the accruals anomaly persists and will probably endure.

Abstract This study investigates security analysts' reactions to public management guidance and assesses whether managers successfully guide analysts toward beatable earnings targets. We use a panel data set between 1995 and 2001 to examine the fiscal‐quarter‐specific determinants of management guidance and the timing, extent, and outcomes of analysts' reactions to this guidance. We find that management guidance is more likely when analysts' initial forecasts are optimistic, and, after controlling for the level of this optimism, when analysts' forecast dispersion is low. Analysts quickly react to management guidance and are more likely to issue final meetable or beatable earnings targets when management provides public guidance. Our evidence suggests that public management guidance plays an important role in leading analysts toward achievable earnings targets.