Knowledge that Transforms

In this study of sell-side analysts’ forecasts, we explore the effects of analyst aptitude, learning-by-doing, and the internal environment of the brokerage house on forecast accuracy. Our results indicate that analysts’ aptitude and brokerage house characteristics are associated with forecast accuracy, while learning-by-doing is only associated with forecast accuracy when we do not control for analysts’ company-specific aptitude in forecasting. It is unlikely that this result is caused by measurement errors because it is robust when we use a sub-sample where we can accurately measure experience.

The frequency and magnitude of restructuring charges have drawn the attention of various groups of users of accounting information. Prior studies on restructuring charges have focused on the market's response to the announcement of the charge. In contrast, we examine the charges from the perspective of financial analysts. We provide evidence that analysts expect declining performance for restructuring firms in the short run but possible improvement over the longer term. When we examine forecast errors in the year following the charge, we find evidence that the analysts’ accuracy has declined and, despite the downward revision, analysts are still optimistically biased.

The appropriateness of financial reporting rules for derivative securities depends on corporations' reasons for using the instruments. Empirically, little is documented about how the instruments affect firms' risk exposures. This study examines derivatives' roles in firms initiating derivatives use. The results are consistent with firms using derivatives to hedge, and not to increase, entity risk. Firm risk (measured several ways) declines following derivatives use. Realized risk reductions and decisions to initiate derivatives programs vary across firms with the expected benefits from hedging. The findings emphasize the importance of hedge-accounting rules that incorporate the impact of derivatives and hedged items simultaneously.

The comment reviews major features of the research design of the DMS study. Several opportunities for future research are discussed, including the exploration of the underlying information variables that influence analyst's forecasts.

We compare First Call analyst forecasts of earnings to unofficial forecasts commonly referred to as whispers. Our analysis indicates that whispers are more accurate proxies for market expectations of earnings than are First Call forecasts, consistent with the claim in the professional press that whispers are increasingly becoming the true market expectation of earnings. Further, trading strategies based on the relation between whisper and First Call forecasts earn abnormal returns. This suggests that whispers contain information not contained in First Call forecasts and that at least part of this information is impounded in price prior to the earnings release.

Contrary to previous studies, we find managers change depreciation policies in predictable ways. We identify three dimensions of depreciation-policy changes: whether it is a method change or an estimate revision; whether it is income-increasing or decreasing; and whether it applies to new assets only or both new and existing assets. This disaggregation leads to three findings: First, a 1981 tax law altered the frequency of estimate revisions and method changes. Second, firms adopting income-increasing method changes for all assets experience worse performance than those adopting such changes only for new assets. Finally, non-income-increasing policy changes are associated with changes in investment opportunities.

With the exception of financial firms, we find no evidence that comprehensive income is more strongly associated with returns/market value or better predicts future cash flows/income than net income. Moreover, the only component of comprehensive income that improves the association between income and returns is the marketable securities adjustment. Our results do not support the claim that comprehensive income is a better measure of firm performance than net income. Our results also raise questions about the appropriateness of items included in SFAS 130 comprehensive income as well as the need for mandating uniform comprehensive income disclosures for all industries.

Accounting research frequently uses R2, for example, to measure value relevance. We show analytically that scale effects present in levels regressions increase R2, and this effect increases in the scale factor's coefficient of variation. Thus, between-sample comparisons of R2 are invalid, unless one controls for differences in the scale factor's coefficient of variation. Applying our analysis to prior research, we show that the documented increase in value relevance of accounting is attributable to increases in the coefficient of variation of the scale factor. Controlling for this effect, there has been a decline in value relevance, as measured by R2.

Harris and Muller (1998)present some interesting evidence on the market valuation of accounting numbers under IAS and US-GAAP. I view this evidence as a first step in contributing to the debate on whether foreign firms following IAS should be allowed to list in the US without providing 20-F reconciliations. In my discussion, I evaluate the contribution and limitations of the study and suggest some extensions.

We characterize the steady-state equilibrium in which informed traders who exhibit heuristic (i.e., representativeness, as opposed to Bayesian) and Bayesian behaviors achieve the same expected utility. Then, we show how the endogenous, steady-state proportion of heuristic traders is affected by the quality of public information and other exogenous features of our model. Finally, we discuss how the presence of heuristic traders potentially alters the link between improved public disclosure and market liquidity, the variance in the change in price, and market efficiency.