I examine the role of convenience in the mutual fund industry. I find that investors pay more for relatively convenient funds, and that the flows to convenient funds are less responsive to performance. These findings suggest that investors do not evaluate mutual funds independently, but rather that investors select a primary fund, likely based on beliefs about managerial ability, and then select funds which are relatively convenient to this primary fund.

I examine the ex ante decision to make an agent's pay-performance sensitivity an inverse function of organization size. I focus on mutual funds and their decision to use compensation contracts that reduce the advisor's marginal compensation as the fund grows (a declining-rate contract) over the dominant contract type, where marginal compensation is unrelated to fund size (a single-rate contract). I find evidence consistent with the view that declining-rate contracts are a mechanism to keep marginal compensation in line with the advisor's declining marginal product. Specifically, I find that funds with greater exposure to diseconomies of scale are more likely to use a declining-rate contract and to specify a greater amount of compensation decline in their contracts. Consistent with optimal contracting, I find no evidence of a performance difference between funds with declining-rate contracts and funds with single-rate contracts.

I provide new tests of regulatory impact on informed trading in the stock market. After the implementation of Reg FD there is a significant decrease in the Hasbrouck [Hasbrouck, J., 1991a. The summary informativeness of stock trades: an econometric analysis. Review of Financial Studies 4, 571–595.] summary informativeness statistic, a measure of informed trading based on intra-daily trade level data. But, the switch to decimalization on the New York Stock Exchange has a much larger impact on this measure. These results highlight the difficulty in attributing specific effects to broad based regulatory events.

A unique dataset of post-IPO thrifts with heterogeneous initial insider ownership allows us to use revealed preferences to determine the level of ownership insiders believe to be optimal. We find strong evidence that insider ownership converges to the 20% to 30% range, whether insiders begin with diffuse or concentrated ownership. This range of ownership has been found consistent with entrenchment and control in the literature. Our results are robust to a battery of variables related to insider ownership such as moral hazard, adverse selection, market timing, insider characteristics, and firm characteristics. Furthermore, we find that managers with diffuse ownership accumulate shares most aggressively during the period of regulatory anti-takeover protection, consistent with an entrenchment motive. We find that managers with above-average pay are more likely to seek higher ownership, consistent with the existence of private benefits of control. Finally, we find that insider ownership determines equity issuance, leverage, and share liquidity in ways consistent with expected accumulation or reduction in insider ownership for control purposes.

We examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty on trade credit. We document a decline (increase) in accounts payable, receivable, and net credit during periods of high (low) policy uncertainty and that firms react quickly to changes in uncertainty. The relation is long-term and holds after controlling for endogeneity, non-policy economic and political uncertainties, and the Great Recession. Industry competitiveness, proxied by firm market power, moderates the impact of economic policy uncertainty on trade credit. Uncertainty about monetary and fiscal policies, taxes, and regulations are the major drivers of trade credit changes. The reduction in trade credit during periods of increasing uncertainty can be explained by financial distress, constraints, and relation-specific investment channels.

Although governments are the majority shareholders in many of the world's largest and most important firms, we know very little about the role of the state as majority shareholder and the potential agency conflicts that exist between the state (as controlling shareholder) and the minority shareholder in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Our study provides new insights regarding the private benefits that may be captured when the state is dominant shareholder (what we refer to as the “private benefits of state control”). We define the private benefits of state control as the political, social, or personal advantages that the controlling politician may be able to extract from the SOE. We identify firm-level and institution-level factors that may impact the amount of the private benefits of state control and present evidence that the private benefits of state control affect economic decision-making.

Using a sample of 102 spinoffs in the period 1981 to 1997, we investigate the relation between corporate governance and the spinoff decision. Diversified firms conducting a spinoff have characteristics previously hypothesized to be associated with more effective corporate governance, such as greater ownership by outside board members, more heterogeneous boards, and fewer board members, in comparison to a set of peer firms. Post spinoff, relative valuation measures increase a significantly greater extent than for peer firms. These findings are consistent with the view that agency problems are a contributing factor in firms maintaining value destroying diversification strategies.

Multinational subsidiaries are generally financed with a mixture of internal debt and equity from the parent corporation. Yet, financial theory has relatively little to say regarding the debt-equity tradeoff and the timing of dividend repatriation in an international setting. In this paper, we derive optimal rules for financing multinational subsidiaries that take into account tax rate differentials and the exploitation of tax-loss credits. We develop a formal multi-period dynamic model to characterize the optimal dividend repatriation policy and the optimal choice of debt-equity mix. The model generates several testable empirical implications that are consistent with available empirical evidence and several others that have not been either discussed or empirically tested in the literature.

Executives with poor prior performance may be inclined to take excessive risk in the hope of meeting performance targets, in which case a compensation contract featuring severance pay can be optimal. While prior work has shown that severance can induce managers to take positive NPV risks, we show that it can also keep them from taking negative NPV risks. We show that severance should be contingent on results: complete failure should nullify any payments. We also show that mandating a firm size that is larger than first-best, while costly, can help screen for good managers.

The public arrest of Adelphia executives on July 24, 2002 signaled tougher enforcement of laws against corporate crime. On that day and the two following days, foreign firms experienced a cumulative 1.7% decline in value. Relative to domestic firms, the loss was a much larger 4.5%. The expected cost to firms from tougher enforcement suggests three possible reasons. Foreign firms may be targeted more heavily, may face greater penalties, or may find it more costly to react to (deflect) enforcement. We find evidence consistent with foreign firms facing higher costs from tougher enforcement for each of these reasons.