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Mortgage prepayment, race, and monetary policy

Journal of Financial Economics 2023 147(3), 498-524 open access
Black and Hispanic homeowners pay significantly higher mortgage interest rates than white and Asian homeowners. We show that the main reason is that white and Asian borrowers are much more likely to exploit periods of falling interest rates by refinancing their mortgages or moving. Black and Hispanic borrowers face challenges refinancing because, on average, they have lower credit scores, equity and income. But even holding those factors constant, Black and Hispanic borrowers refinance less, suggesting that other factors are at play. Because they are more likely to exploit lower interest rates, white borrowers benefit more from monetary expansions. Policies that reduce barriers to refinancing for minority borrowers and alternative mortgage contract designs can reduce racial mortgage pricing inequality.

Does social capital mitigate agency problems? Evidence from Chief Executive Officer (CEO) compensation

Journal of Financial Economics 2019 133(2), 498-519 open access
We find that social capital, as captured by secular norms and social networks surrounding corporate headquarters, is negatively associated with levels of CEO compensation. This relation holds in a range of robustness tests including those that address omitted variable bias and reverse causality. Additionally, social capital reduces the likelihood that firms make opportunistic option grant awards that unduly favor CEOs, including lucky awards, backdated awards, and unscheduled awards. Social capital also lessens the accretive effect of CEO power on CEO compensation. These findings indicate that social capital mitigates agency problems by restraining managerial rent extraction in CEO compensation.

Beauty is in the eye of the beholder: The effect of corporate tax avoidance on the cost of bank loans

Journal of Financial Economics 2014 113(1), 109-130 open access
We find that firms with greater tax avoidance incur higher spreads when obtaining bank loans. This finding is robust in a battery of sensitivity analyses and in two quasi-experimental settings including the implementation of Financial Accounting Standards Board Interpretation No. 48 and the revelation of past tax sheltering activity. Firms with greater tax avoidance also incur more stringent nonprice loan terms, incur higher at-issue bond spreads, and prefer bank loans over public bonds when obtaining debt financing. Overall, these findings indicate that banks perceive tax avoidance as engendering significant risks.