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Journal of Financial Economics 1994 35(1), 137-138

Aftermarket support and underpricing of initial public offerings

Journal of Financial Economics 1994 35(2), 199-219
We study the aftermarket for 72 initial public offerings (IPOs) using comprehensive trade and quote-change data from every market maker for the first three days of trading. Underwriters quote higher bid prices than other market makers for issues that commence trading at or below the offer price. Underwriters repurchase large quantities of stock in the aftermarket without risk by overselling the issue by the amount of the overallotment option. If the IPO is hot, the overallotment option is exercised. If not, the short position is covered with aftermarket selling. We discuss several reasons for underwriter support.

Voucher privatization

Journal of Financial Economics 1994 35(2), 249-266 open access
Several Eastern European countries have initiated mass privatization programs to transfer state-owned assets to the general population. We show that the decision to pursue mass privatization and even the specific design of the programs are largely dictated by politics. Nonetheless, politically feasible programs can also be made attractive from an economic standpoint in terms of maximizing value, fostering free and efficient markets, and promoting corporate governance. In general, the design of economic institutions is critically shaped by political factors, although satisfactory economic results can be achieved in spite of political constraints.

The collapse of First Executive Corporation junk bonds, adverse publicity, and the ‘run on the bank’ phenomenon

Journal of Financial Economics 1994 36(3), 287-336
In April 1991, regulators seized the major subsidiaries of First Executive Corporation (FE), an insurer that invested heavily in junk bonds. During the junk bond market turmoil of 1989–1990, adverse publicity fueled a bank run at FE, forcing a $4 billion portfolio liquidation before the market rose 50–60% in 1991–1992. More traditional insurers did not receive commensurate press coverage, despite their substantial exposure to real estate declines, which were roughly 2.5 times the junk bond decline. Seizure of FE's subsidiaries was defensible, although FE would have become solvent within a year, given average junk bond market appreciation.

Information, trading, and volatility

Journal of Financial Economics 1994 36(1), 127-154 open access
We examine the effects of trading and information flows on the short-run behavior of stock prices by comparing the behavior of stock return volatility during trading and nontrading periods. We define nontrading periods as periods when exchanges and businesses are open but traders endogenously choose not to trade. After correcting for the bid/ask bounce and stickiness in quotes, we find that a large proportion of daily stock return volatility occurs without trades, especially for large firms. Furthermore, we provide new evidence that public (versus private) information is the major source of short-term return volatility.

Organizational form and the consequences of highly leveraged transactions: Kroger's recapitalization and Safeway's LBO

Journal of Financial Economics 1994 36(2), 193-224
This paper compares the leveraged recapitalization of Kroger Co. with the leveraged buyout of Safeway Stores. While both transactions dramatically increased leverage, Safeway's also altered managerial ownership, board composition, and executive compensation, while Kroger's did not. My analysis suggests that these differences in organizational form lead to large differences in post-HLT restructuring actions and value creation. I conclude that the improved incentive structure and increased monitoring provided by the LBO specialist at Safeway lead managers to generate cash in a more productive manner than the organizational structure employed by Kroger.

Does industrial structure explain the benefits of international diversification?

Journal of Financial Economics 1994 36(1), 3-27
We examine the influence of industrial structure on the cross-sectional volatility and correlation structure of country index returns for 12 European countries between 1978 and 1992. We find that industrial structure explains very little of the cross-sectional difference in country return volatility, and that the low correlation between country indices is almost completely due to country-specific sources of return variation. Diversification across countries within an industry is a much more effective tool for risk reduction than industry diversification within a country.

Appointments of outsiders to Japanese boards: Determinants and implications for managers

Journal of Financial Economics 1994 36(2), 225-258
This paper investigates the determinants of appointments of outsiders — directors previously employed by banks (bank directors) or by other nonfinancial firms (corporate directors) — to the boards of large nonfinancial Japanese corporations. Such appointments increase with poor stock performance; those of bank directors also increase with earnings losses. Turnover of incumbent top executives increases substantially in the year of both types of outside appointments. We perform a similar analysis for outside appointments in large U.S. firms and find different patterns. We conclude that banks and corporate shareholders play an important monitoring and disciplinary role in Japan.

How managerial wealth affects the tender offer process

Journal of Financial Economics 1994 35(1), 63-97
We present empirical evidence on the relation between changes in managerial wealth and tender offer characteristics. Changes in managerial wealth resulting from a tender offer are negatively related to the likelihood of managerial resistance to a tender offer and positively related to the likelihood of tender offer success. We also document that the abnormal returns to tender offers are lower for hostile than for friendly offers if we control for the tender offer premium. Finally, we find that the top executive gains, whereas outside shareholders do not gain, from management's decision to resist the tender offer.

Outside directors and the adoption of poison pills

Journal of Financial Economics 1994 35(3), 371-390
We find that the average stock-market reaction to announcements of poison pills is positive when the board has a majority of outside directors and negative when it does not. The probability that a subsequent control contest is associated with an auction is also positively related to the fraction of outsiders on the board. These results are largely driven by directors who are retired executives from other companies. The evidence suggests that outside directors serve the interests of shareholders.