Knowledge that Transforms

Endogenous cycles emerge through the two-way interaction between lending standards and production fundamentals. Lax lending standards in booms lead to low interest rates and high output but the deterioration of future loan quality. Low borrower quality in turn precipitates tight standards: the economy enters a recession with high credit spreads and low output but a gradual improvement in the quality of loans. This eventually triggers a shift back to a boom with lax lending, and the cycle continues. The capitalization of expert investors determines the strength of capital reallocation in recessions. Furthermore, although the constrained efficient economy is often cyclical, it features both a static and a dynamic externality in credit supply, hence differing from the decentralized equilibrium.

We show that the TFP growth of European micro, small, and medium-sized firms (SMEs) diverged from large firms after the global financial crisis. The average postcrisis TFP growth of medium-sized, small, and micro firms was, respectively, 1.1, 2.9, and 5.4 percentage points lower than that of large firms. This SME productivity gap is larger for firms with more severe credit supply shocks. The gap is partially attributable to a larger postcrisis reduction in intangible capital at SMEs than at large firms. Horseraces suggest that SME indicators are more robust and more powerful predictors of postcrisis TFP growth than other indicators.

We document the phenomenon that average excess returns of out-of-the-money puts and calls on bond futures are negative, both unconditionally and conditionally on economic states. To explain these findings, we develop economically motivated restrictions in the context of a theory in which the pricing kernel is a general diffusion process with spanned and unspanned components. Our reconciliation is a framework that introduces market incompleteness and priced unspanned volatility risks, allowing for time-varying downside and upside futures risk premiums. The estimated model shows consistency with data on bond yields, yield volatilities, bond futures return volatilities, option prices, and option risk premiums.

We examine the role of first impressions in angel investor decision-making. Video stills of entrepreneurs pitching on the Shark Tank show and in Startup Battlefield competitions yield six measures of first impressions of entrepreneurs’ facial traits and two principal components: one that captures general ability and the other that contrasts charm and managerial ability. We find positive associations between both components and the likelihood of entrepreneurs receiving an investment offer or winning a competition round. Post-event business outcome analyses reveal that investors internalize entrepreneurs’ general ability rationally but exhibit irrational tendencies when internalizing entrepreneurs’ charm and managerial ability. Investment experience mitigates investors’ irrational use of charm and managerial ability cues.

Exchange rate volatility falls after a trade deal, driven by a decline in the systematic component of risk. The average trade deal increases trade by 50 percent over five years, reducing systematic risk by a third of a standard deviation across countries. We examine this connection in an Armington model where the structure of trade networks determines the risk in exchange rates. We estimate our model to current data and find i) that countries at the periphery of the world trade network benefit the most from lower trade barriers and ii) that a counterfactual experiment of a trade war between the US and China shows a global increase in currency risk, with effects concentrated among peripheral countries.

Do investors reach for yield when interest rates are low and does this behavior affect the housing market? Using the unique setting and data of 18th-century Amsterdam, I show that reach-for-yield behavior of wealthy investors resulted in a large boom and bust in house prices and major changes in rental yields. Exploiting changes in the supply of bonds, I show that investors living off capital income shifted their portfolios towards real estate and other higher-yielding assets when bond yields were low and decreasing. This behavior exacerbated house price volatility and increased housing wealth inequality.

We document a regime change in the Treasury market post-Global Financial Crisis (GFC): dealers switched from net short to net long Treasury bonds. We construct “net-long” and “net-short” curves that account for balance sheet and financing costs, and show that actual yields moved from the net short curve pre-GFC to the net long curve post-GFC. Our theory shows the regime shift caused negative swap spreads and co-movement among swap spreads, dealer positions, and covered-interest-parity violations. Furthermore, the effects of various monetary and regulatory policies are regime-dependent. We highlight Treasury supply as a plausible driver of this regime shift.

Jumps in asset prices are ubiquitous, yet the apparent high price of jump risk observed empirically is commonly viewed as puzzling. We develop new model-free short-time risk-neutral variance expansions, allowing us to clearly delineate the importance of jumps in generating both price and variance risks. We find that simultaneous jumps in the price and the stochastic volatility and/or jump intensity of the market commands a sizeable risk premium. The existence of “jump leverage” risk premium may be rationalized in the context of equilibrium-based models by jumps in the conditional moments of the underlying fundamentals and/or changes in investors' risk aversion.

We study insurance and portfolio decisions, two opposite risk retention tradeoffs. Using household level data, we identify the first joint determinants (e.g. subjective expectations, risk attitude) and frictions (e.g. liquidity constraints , financial literacy) in the literature. We also find key differences between the two decisions. Notably, contrary to economic intuition, risky asset holding and insurance coverage both increase with wealth . We show that this apparent puzzle is driven in part by a specific behavioral pattern (the poor invest too conservatively, while the rich over-insure), and can be explained by two factors: regret avoidance and nonperformance risk.