Knowledge that Transforms

This paper introduces collateral rehypothecation, a widespread practice in derivatives, swaps, and repo markets, in a general equilibrium model with default. Rehypothecation frees up collateral because it allows lenders to resell or repledge assets pledged by borrowers. The risk that lenders will not return the asset, however, limits gains from rehypothecation. Still, when markets are contractually incomplete or decentralized, rehypothecation can achieve a superior use of scarce collateral. These results have implications for the repo market and suggest that limits to rehypothecation can cause price fragmentation.

Do targeted macroprudential measures impact non-targeted sectors too? We investigate the compositional changes in the supply of credit by Swiss banks, exploiting their differential exposure to the activation in 2013 of the countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) which targeted banks’ exposure to residential mortgages. We find that the additional capital requirements resulting from the activation of the CCyB are associated with higher growth in banks’ commercial lending. While banks are lending more to all types of businesses, the new macroprudential policy benefits smaller and riskier businesses the most. However, the interest rates and other costs of obtaining credit for these firms rise as well.

This paper examines how the coordination of venture capital (VC) investors in their syndicates, as measured by their geographic concentration, affects firm performance and ex ante contractual terms. Using the introduction of new airline routes between the locations of VC investors as a shock to their coordination costs, we find that firms with geographically concentrated VC investors are more likely to exit successfully than other firms. Geographically proximate VC investors are also more likely to form syndicates in follow-up rounds and to use less intensive staged financing and fewer convertible securities.

While economic forecasting is ubiquitous within the industry, its role in the trading process has received little attention in the literature. We examine how economist forecasts are related to trading activity in the OTC treasury bond market at the participant level. Consistent with models of heterogeneous opinions, we show that the forecasting economists employing institution places a disproportionately large reliance on the forecast. There is pervasive evidence that this reliance is asymmetric. Only forecasts which imply a fall in future treasury bond prices are associated with an abnormal trading reaction consistent with the forecast. Reference dependence and loss aversion offer one possible explanation for this asymmetric trading response.

Liquidity shocks transmitted through interbank connections contributed to bank distress during the Great Depression. New data on interbank connections reveal that banks were vulnerable to closures of their correspondents and their respondents. Further, banks were less responsive to network liquidity risk in their management of cash and capital buffers after the Federal Reserve was established, suggesting that banks expected the Fed to reduce that risk. The Fed's presence weakened incentives for the most systemically important banks to maintain capital and cash buffers against liquidity risk, and thereby likely contributed to the banking system's vulnerability to contagion during the Depression.

We survey more than 200 private equity (PE) managers from firms with $1.9 trillion of assets under management (AUM) about their portfolio performance, decision-making and activities during the Covid-19 pandemic. Given that PE managers have significant incentives to maximize value, their actions during the pandemic should indicate what they perceive as being important for both the preservation and creation of value. PE managers believe that 40% of their portfolio companies are moderately negatively affected and 10% are very negatively affected by the pandemic. The private equity managers—both investment and operating partners—are actively engaged in the operations, governance, and financing in all of their current portfolio companies. These activities are more intensively pursued in those companies that have been more severely affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. As a result of the pandemic, they expect the performance of their existing funds to decline. They are more pessimistic about that decline than the venture capitalists (VCs) surveyed in Gompers et al. (2021). Despite the pandemic, private equity managers are seeking new investments. Rather than focusing on cost cutting, PE investors place a much greater weight on revenue growth for value creation. Relative to the 2012 survey results reported in Gompers, Kaplan, and Mukharlyamov (2016), they appear to give a larger equity stake to management teams and target somewhat lower returns.

Investors delegating their wealth to privately informed managers face not only an intrinsic asymmetric information problem but also a potential misalignment in risk preferences. In this setting, we show that by tying fees symmetrically to the appropriate benchmark investors can tilt a fund portfolio toward their optimal risk exposure and realize nearly all the value of managers’ information. They attain these benefits despite an inherent inefficiency in the choice of the benchmark, and at no extra cost of compensating managers for exposure to relative-performance risk. Under certain conditions, benchmark-adjusted performance fees are necessary to prevent passive alternatives from dominating active management. Our results shed light on a recent debate on the appropriate fee structure of active funds in contexts of high competition from passive funds.

Why did the failure of Lehman Brothers make the financial crisis dramatically worse? Our answer is that the financial crisis was a process of a build-up of risk during the crisis prior to the Lehman failure. During the crisis market participants tried to preserve an option to withdraw by shortening maturities — the “flight from maturity”. We show that the flight from maturity was manifested in a steepening of the term structures of spreads in money markets. With increasingly short maturities, lenders created the possibility of fast exit. The failure of Lehman Brothers was the tipping point of this build-up of systemic fragility. A crisis is a dynamic process in which “tail risk” is endogenous.

Whether an inversion is associated with weaker firm governance is an open empirical question. While many inversions happen to countries that offer weaker protection to minority shareholders than the U.S., most firms that invert continue to be treated by the SEC as an “U.S. issuer”, and thus, their shareholders benefit from the full protection offered by the U.S. Federal Securities Laws. Our analysis shows that firms that invert exhibit an increase in their stock illiquidity, information asymmetries, and a decrease in their institutional shareholdings, indicating a weaker market-based governance following the inversion. Executives also receive a smaller proportion of equity-based compensation and their wealth is less sensitive to stock prices following the inversion. Thus, despite enjoying the full protection of federal securities laws, investors perceive inverted firms to have weaker governance relative to comparable U.S. firms.

How does management insulation from shareholder pressure influence banks’ resilience to crises? To address this question, we develop a measure of management insulation based on legal provisions. Unlike the existing alternatives, our measure considers the interactions between different provisions. We use this measure to study the relationship between management insulation and bank failure during the 2007–09 financial crisis. We find that banks in which managers were more insulated from shareholders in 2003 were less likely to be both bailed out in 2008/09 and targeted by activist shareholders. By contrast, alternative measures of management insulation fail to predict both bailouts and shareholder activism.