Knowledge that Transforms

Abstract While the production of credit ratings has long been limited mainly to rating agencies (CRAs), recent years have seen the growing popularity of consensus credit ratings crowdsourced from banks (i.e., bank ratings). We provide the first comprehensive examination of the properties and informativeness of bank ratings relative to CRA ratings. We find that bank ratings often deviate from CRA ratings, with over 60% of firm-months having different bank and CRA ratings. These deviations contain useful information. Bank ratings improve out-of-sample prediction of defaults and CRA rating revisions and explain the cross-section of credit spreads. However, bank ratings do not improve out-of-sample prediction of credit excess returns, indicating that current prices incorporate bank rating information. Overall our findings suggest that bank ratings are a useful supplement to traditional credit ratings.

Abstract We develop a method for extracting “other information” from the articulation between bottom-line accounting numbers and stock prices. We posit that “other information” captures future earnings growth originating from conservative accounting recognition principles as demonstrated by Penman and Zhang (2020) and Penman and Zhu (2022), as well as nonzero net present value investment opportunities. Our findings confirm that “other information” is strongly associated with various proxies for expected future earnings growth and firm risk attributes. Furthermore, we show how a structural expected return model incorporating our “other information” estimate can predict out-of-sample future stock returns and generate sizeable long-short return spreads.

Abstract We find irregular patterns in the distribution of firms’ reported quarterly gross margin percentages. Specifically, there is significant bunching around percentage integers that are highly round (e.g., multiples of 10, such as 30%, 40%, etc.) or are neatly divisible (e.g., 25%, 75%), compared to what is predicted by counterfactual distributions. Further investigation reveals that highly round gross margin firms are smaller, exert higher effort, achieve higher productivity, have more difficult goals, and pay their CEOs with a higher portion of fixed income. We also find that highly round gross margins are associated with superior performance. Additionally, we do not find consistent evidence that highly round gross margin reference points are linked to external rewards. Collectively, our evidence is consistent with reference-dependent preferences for highly round gross margins likely being driven by intrinsic (rather than extrinsic) motivations.

Abstract We provide a lower-bound estimate of the undetected share of corporate fraud. To identify the hidden part of the “iceberg,” we exploit Arthur Andersen’s demise, which triggered added scrutiny on Arthur Andersen’s former clients and thereby increased the detection likelihood of preexisting frauds. Our evidence suggests that in normal times only one-third of corporate frauds are detected. We estimate that on average 10% of large publicly traded firms are committing securities fraud every year, with a 95% confidence interval of 7%-14%. Combining fraud pervasiveness with existing estimates of the costs of detected and undetected fraud, we estimate that corporate fraud destroys 1.6% of equity value each year, equal to $830 billion in 2021.