Microcredit and other forms of small-scale finance have failed to catalyze entrepreneurship in developing countries. In these credit markets, borrowers and lenders often bargain over not only the interest rate but also implicit restrictions on types of investment. We build a dynamic model of informal lending and show this may lead to endogenous debt traps. Lenders constrain business growth for poor borrowers, yet richer borrowers may grow their businesses faster than they could have without credit. The theory offers nuanced comparative statics and rationalizes the low average impact and low demand of microfinance, despite its high impact on larger businesses.

Do impact investors seek impact, or merely “impact wash”? We provide systematic evidence on the nonfinancial determinants of impact investing. Impact investors focus on firms aligned with the priorities of the federal government and disproportionately invest in economically disadvantaged regions. While we find high levels of coinvestment between impact and traditional investors, we also show that impact investors influence the strategies of their traditional coinvestors, are more likely to fund firms in nascent industries, and invest countercyclically. Finally, we characterize investment heterogeneity based on a novel classification of impact investment theses, with a focus on climate, environment, and jobs and equity.