We study how government control affects the roles of the media as an information intermediary and a corporate monitor. Comparing a large sample of news articles written by state-controlled and market-oriented Chinese media, we find that articles by the market-oriented media are more critical, more accurate, more comprehensive, and timelier than those by the state-controlled media. Moreover, only articles by the market-oriented media have a significant corporate governance impact. Subsample analyses, interviews with journalists, and a survey of university students suggest that the market-oriented media’s superior effects are explained by their operating efficiency and independence.

We study how political capture affects the corporate governance role of the media. Relying on a unique media market in China that is characterized by the prevalence of both state-controlled and market-oriented media, we manually construct a comprehensive financial news sample containing 80,008 articles during the 2004–2010 period and provide evidence that negative coverage by the market-oriented media significantly increases the chance of forced top executive turnover, whereas similar coverage by the state-controlled media has no such impact. A multi-pronged approach that includes an instrumental variable test, an exogenous event, firm fixed effects, and change-in-change specifications provides positive evidence of the casual link. Further analysis reveals that the disciplinary effect of the market-oriented media is stronger for firms that are less likely to be influenced by political capture, such as non-state-owned firms or firms located in provinces with good institutions.

Boards are crucial to shareholder wealth. Yet little is known about how shareholder oversight affects director incentives. Using exogenous shocks to institutional investor portfolios, we find that institutional investor distraction weakens board oversight. Distracted institutions are less likely to discipline ineffective directors with negative votes. Consequently, independent directors face weaker monitoring incentives and exhibit poor board performance; ineffective independent directors are also more frequently appointed. Moreover, we find that the adverse effects of investor distraction on various corporate governance outcomes are stronger among firms with problematic directors. Our findings suggest that institutional investor monitoring creates important director incentives to monitor.