Most informal finance comes from family and friends. Existing informal finance theories cannot match two characteristics of family finance: family investors may accept belowmarket or even negative returns, yet borrowers often prefer formal finance. We argue that social preferences make family finance cheap but create shadow costs that nonetheless discourage its use: Committing family funds to risky investment displaces intrafamily insurance and undermines limited liability. The same characteristics that sustain familial insurance thus render family finance a poor source of risk capital. Even when overcoming capital constraints requires social ties, intermediation and semiformalization may therefore be crucial for promoting risk taking.

We model risk management as information acquisition that delays trading decisions. In markets with preemptive competition, this can lead to a race to the bottom, where prioritizing trade execution over risk management is optimal for each firm, but collectively inefficient. As time competition intensifies, mean trading profit supplants risk concerns as the main driver of risk management quality, causing risk misallocation to rise with trading speed and volume. This pathology of risk management failure—the trio of time-consuming risk assessment, preemptive competition, and boom markets—has distinctive regulatory implications.

Financing from family and friends is the predominant type of informal finance. This paper proposes a theory that reconciles two seemingly paradoxical traits of this form of finance, namely, it is often provided at negative prices but nevertheless eschewed by borrowers. A central prediction is that such finance, while breeding trust, deters risk taking. Demand is thus constrained: entrepreneurs may forgo risky investment rather than finance it through family and friends. Formal finance is valuable precisely because it is regulated only by contract. The highlighted trade-offs between formal and informal finance are potentially relevant for the provision of microventure capital.

We compare activism and takeovers from the perspective of a blockholder who can provide effort to improve firm value. We show that free-riding behavior by dispersed shareholders has the following implications: First, activism can be more profitable than a hostile takeover even if it is less efficient. Second, activism is most efficient when it brokers, rather than substitutes for, takeovers. Third, such takeover activism earns superior returns. More broadly, our theory implies that activists specialize in governance reforms with limited, temporary ownership being a strength rather than a shortcoming of activism.

We study the structure of public firm buyouts in a model that features the Berle-Means problem (lack of incentives) and the Grossman-Hart problem (holdout). We find that bootstrapping, debt in excess of funding needs, and upfront fees to bidders are socially optimal and increase buyout premiums. These elements make LBO financing tantamount to a “management contract” arranged by an outside manager to receive cash and incentives to manage a firm—except the cash is funded by excess debt imposed on the firm. Our model also rationalizes why PE firms collect fees from their equity partnerships and directly from target firms.