Knowledge that Transforms

A menu of paired lottery choices is structured so that the crossover point to the high-risk lottery can be used to infer the degree of risk aversion. With “normal” laboratory payoffs of several dollars, most subjects are risk averse and few are risk loving. Scaling up all payoffs by factors of twenty, fifty, and ninety makes little difference when the high payoffs are hypothetical. In contrast, subjects become sharply more risk averse when the high payoffs are actually paid in cash. A hybrid “power/expo” utility function with increasing relative and decreasing absolute risk aversion nicely replicates the data patterns over this range of payoffs from several dollars to several hundred dollars. Although risk aversion is a fundamental element in standard theories of lottery choice, asset valuation, contracts, and insurance (e.g. Daniel Bernoulli, 1738; John Pratt, 1964; Kenneth Arrow, 1965), experimental research has provided little guidance as to how risk aversion should be modeled. To date, there have been several approaches used to assess the importance and nature of risk aversion. Using lottery choice data from a field experiment, Hans Binswanger (1980) concluded that most farmers exhibit a significant amount of risk aversion that tends to increase as payoffs are increased. Alternatively, risk aversion can be inferred from bidding and pricing tasks. In auctions, overbidding relative to Nash predictions has been attributed to risk aversion by some and to noisy decision-making by others, since the payoff consequences of such overbidding tend to be small (Glenn Harrison, 1989). Vernon Smith and James Walker (1993) assess the effects of noise and decision cost by dramatically scaling up auction payoffs. They find little support for the noise hypothesis, reporting that there is an insignificant increase in overbidding in private value auctions as payoffs are scaled up by factors of 5, 10, and 20. Another way to infer risk aversion is to elicit buying and/or selling prices for simple lotteries. Steven Kachelmeier and Mohamed Shehata (1992) report a significant increase in risk aversion (or, more precisely, a decrease in risk seeking behavior) as the prize value is increased. However, they also obtain dramatically different results depending on whether the choice task involves buying or selling, since subjects tend to put a high selling price on something they “own” and a lower buying price on something they do not, which implies This is analogous to the well-known “willingness to pay/willingness to accept bias.” Asking for a high selling price 1 implies a preference for the risk inherent in the lottery, and offering a low purchase price implies an aversion to the risk in the lottery. Thus the way that the pricing task is framed can alter the implied risk attitudes in a dramatic manner. The issue is whether seemingly inconsistent estimates are due to a problem with the way risk aversion is conceptualized, or to a behavioral bias that is activated by the experimental design. We chose to avoid this possible complication by framing the decisions in terms of choices, not purchases and sales. 3 risk seeking behavior in one case and risk aversion in the other. Independent of the method used to elicit 1 a measure of risk aversion, there is widespread belief (with some theoretical support discussed below) that the degree of risk aversion needed to explain behavior in low-payoff settings would imply absurd levels of risk aversion in high-payoff settings. The upshot of this is that risk aversion effects are controversial and often ignored in the analysis of laboratory data. This general approach has not caused much concern because most theorists are used to bypassing risk aversion issues by assuming that the payoffs for a game are already measured as utilities. The nature of risk aversion (to what extent it exists, and how it depends on the size of the stake) is ultimately an empirical issue, and additional laboratory experiments can produce useful evidence that complements field observations by providing careful controls of probabilities and payoffs. However, even many of those economists who admit that risk aversion may be important have asserted that decision makers should be approximately risk neutral for the low-payoff decisions (involving several dollars) that are typically encountered in the laboratory. The implication, that low laboratory incentives may be somewhat unrealistic and therefore not useful in measuring attitudes toward “real-world” risks, is echoed by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky (1979), who suggest an alternative: Experimental studies typically involve contrived gambles for small stakes, and a large number of repetitions of very similar problems. These features of laboratory gambling complicate the interpretation of the results and restrict their generality. By default, the method of hypothetical choices emerges as the simplest procedure by which a large number of theoretical questions can be investigated. The use of the method relies of the assumption that people often know how they would behave in actual situations of choice, and on the further assumption that the subjects have no special reason to disguise their true preferences. (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 265) In this paper, we directly address these issues by presenting subjects with simple choice tasks that

The economic analysis of property rights proceeds in two steps. The first distinguishes rival from nonrival goods. The second contrasts the welfare effects of property rights for these two types of goods. For rival goods, strong property rights lead to efficient outcomes. For nonrival goods, property rights involve the trade-off formalized by William Nordhaus (1969): Weak property rights lead to under-provision. Strong property rights create monopoly distortions. Recent discussions of copyright protection for recorded music have obscured the underlying economic issues. Interested firms deny that music-sharing will reduce the incentives for firms to release new recordings. Artists and recording companies never acknowledge the efficiency costs of prices that far exceed marginal cost. It is left to economists with no stake in the outcome to clarify these issues. (Full disclosure: I have not consulted for anyone in the Napster case.) The stakes in the battle over the music business are small enough to get lost in rounding

This paper analyzes airport congestion when carriers are nonatomistic, showing how the results of the road-pricing literature are modified when the economic agents causing congestion have market power. The analysis shows that when an airport is dominated by a monopolist, congestion is fully internalized, yielding no role for congestion pricing under monopoly conditions. Under a Cournot oligopoly, however, carriers are shown to internalize only the congestion they impose on themselves. A toll that captures the uninternalized portion of congestion may then improve the allocation of traffic. The analysis is supported by some rudimentary empirical evidence.

Our analysis of the contribution of education to growth recognizes its dual role of building human capital and promoting a common culture. It indicates that when different cultural groups separately determine the cultural orientation of their school curricula this may result in excessive polarization and sub-optimal growth. The optimal trajectory involves a gradual, reciprocal convergence of school curricula towards the middle, but may be difficult to implement in a political context in which curricula are determined by legislative bargaining. Coercive centralization then results in overly rapid homogenization and may not be superior to a decentralized school system.

This paper uses data on adopted children to examine the relative importance of biology and environment in determining educational and labor market outcomes. I employ three long-term panel data sets which contain information on adopted children, their adoptive parents, and their biological parents. In at least two of the three data sets, the mechanism for assigning children to adoptive parents is fairly random and does not match children to adoptive parents based on health, race, or ability. I find that adoptive parents' education and income have a modest impact on child test scores but a large impact on college attendance, marital status, and earnings. In contrast with existing work on IQ scores, I do not find that the influence of adoptive parents declines with child age.

Use It or Lose It: Teaching Literacy in the Economics Principles Course by W. Lee Hansen, Michael K. Salemi and John J. Siegfried. Published in volume 92, issue 2, pages 463-472 of American Economic Review, May 2002

This paper investigates the effect of limited enforcement of contracts on asset returns in a three-period pure- exchange overlapping generations economy. We consider a life-cycle setting with a safe and a risky asset and find that lack of commitment can significantly affect the rate of returns of these assets and possibly generate large equity premia.

In the main, empirical research is regarded as subordinate to theory. Theorists perform the difficult and innovative work of conceiving new and sometimes ingenious explanations for the world around us, leaving empiricists the relatively mundane task of gathering data and applying tools (supplied by theoretical econometricians) to support or reject hypotheses that emanate from the theory. To be sure, facts by themselves are worthless, “a mass of descriptive material waiting for a theory, or a fire,” as Ronald H. Coase (1984 p. 230), in characteristic form, dismissed the contribution of the oldschool institutionalists. But without diminishing in any way the creativity inherent in good theoretical work, it is worth remembering that theory without evidence is, in the end, just speculation. Two questions that theory alone can never answer are: First, which of the logically possible explanations for observed phenomena is the most probable? And second, are the phenomena that constitute the object of our speculations important? Modern empirical research on the firm, which dates to Kirk Monteverde and David J. Teece’s articles examining automotive procurement (1982a, b), is now substantial. Rather than try to summarize or discuss particular results of that literature, for which there are already several excellent surveys (the most recent of which is that of Christopher Boerner and Jeffrey Macher [2001]), my aim in the following is to comment more generally on the overall state of knowledge, particularly, the lessons that can be gleaned from the empirical literature about the relative usefulness of transaction-cost and agency theories of the firm and about the value of continued research on economic organization.