Knowledge that Transforms

Internal control system, Decision making, Parallel-processing control decisions

Douglas V. DeJong, Robert Forsythe, Russell J. Lundholm, Wilfred C. Uecker, A Laboratory Investigation of the Moral Hazard Problem in an Agency Relationship, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 23, Studies on Accounting Earnings and Security Valuation: Current Research Issues (1985), pp. 81-120

This paper presents an analysis of the audit risk consequences of PPD ex- tremeness deficiencies and miscalibration.While there is empirical evidence that auditors, like many other decision makers, assess miscalibrated PPDs , the attendant inferential risk consequences of such deficiencies have not been addressed in the extant literature.The comparative statics analysis performed in this study indicates that the risk effects of miscalibration and extremeness deficiencies on the auditor's (substantive testing) evaluation decision are complex and cannot be predicted from an examination of the planning (sampling size) decision.

Voluntary Disclosure, Management forecasts, Earnings volatility, Timing

Barry R. Marks, Krishnamurthy K. Raman, The Importance of Pension Data for Municipal and State Creditor Decisions: Replication and Extensions, Journal of Accounting Research, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Autumn, 1985), pp. 878-886

Responsibility accounting, Performance evaluation, Principle-agent model, Compensation

Internal auditors, Objectivity

Inventory accounting method, Political costs, Agency costs, Production and investment characteristics

[The existence of perfect equilibrium is demonstrated for a class of games with compact space of histories and continuous payoffs, and in which the set of actions feasible at any given period is a lower hemicontinuous correspondence of the previous history of the game. The proof is by construction. A set of histories is constructed, each of which is the equilibrium path of some perfect equilibrium point of the game. Also, any equilibrium path is a member of this set. The construction therefore provides a characterization of perfect equilibrium.]

Let F be a private ownership economy. Call an allocation w for a price vector p if no agent can benefit by trading less at p. We prove that, under differentiability and interiority, if w is voluntary and Pareto efficient it is a competitive equilibrium for W. Perhaps surprisingly, production economies where some agents receive profit income require a stronger voluntariness condition than the one sufficient for exchange economies. The stronger condition singles out a commodity as a medium of exchange.