Knowledge that Transforms

The objective of this study is to examine managerial involvement in auditor selection decisions when audit committees are “directly responsible” for auditor relationships, including selection of the audit firm. The Sarbanes‐Oxley Act (SOX) of (2002) requires fully independent audit committees to be “directly responsible for the appointment, compensation, and oversight of the work of any registered public accounting firm” (Section 301). This statutory requirement is a regulatory attempt to eliminate management influence over the external auditor and align auditor incentives with those of the board and shareholders.1 While regulators largely assume that audit committees take responsibility for auditor selection in the post‐SOX period (Doty 2011), there exists no archival analysis testing this assumption. Therefore, the effectiveness of this regulation (SOX Section 301) remains uncertain. In this paper, we examine (a) whether contrary to the intent of SOX, managers continue to influence auditor selection decisions in the post‐SOX period, and (b) whether this influence subsequently impairs auditor independence as presumed in the legislation.

Hedge fund intervention has been associated with many positive corporate changes and is an important vehicle for informed shareholder monitoring. Effective monitoring has also been positively associated with accounting conservatism. Building upon these prior results, we predict an increase in accounting conservatism after hedge fund intervention. We use a large sample of hedge fund activist events and identify control firms with similar likelihoods of being targeted using the propensity score matching method to apply difference‐in‐difference tests. We find that when hedge fund activists have relatively large ownership and sufficient time to exert their monitoring power, target firms experience significant increases in conditional conservatism. CFO turnovers, upward/lateral auditor switches, and improvements in audit committee independence after intervention are accompanied by greater increases in conditional conservatism. Finally, we find greater increases in conditional conservatism when there is a lack of monitoring by dedicated institutional investors before the intervention. Our study suggests that hedge fund activists improve accounting monitoring tools and thus adds important new evidence on the effectiveness of shareholder monitoring on accounting practices.

We examine the determinants and outcomes of Chief Executive Officers ( CEO s) accepting a $1 salary, a compensation practice that occurs relatively frequently in high‐profile firms and is debated by regulators, investors, and the media. Using a hand‐collected sample of 93 CEO s from 91 firms between 1993 and 2011, we examine the triggers preceding the $1 salary decision, the factors associated with the decision, subsequent stock returns, and the outcomes for the CEO s. Our evidence is consistent with two explanations for the phenomenon: (i) it is a gesture of sacrifice by CEO s of firms in crisis, and (ii) it is a signal of better future performance by CEO s of growing firms. Our analyses highlight the two different circumstances and shed light on an interesting debate that has thus far been supported only by anecdotal evidence.

The SEC and FASB recently expressed concerns that investors do not fully assimilate all of the information provided by complex and incomplete derivatives and other comprehensive income ( OCI ) disclosures. My evidence supports these concerns. Specifically, I examine the information content of unrealized cash flow hedge gains/losses for future profitability and stock returns. An unrealized gain on a cash flow hedge suggests that the price of the underlying hedged item (i.e., commodity price, foreign currency exchange rate, or interest rate) moved in a direction that will impair the firm's profits after the hedge expires. Consequently, I find that unrealized cash flow hedge gains/losses are negatively associated with future gross profit after the firm's existing hedges have expired. This association only holds after the firm has reclassified its hedges into earnings, and is weaker for firms that can pass input price changes on to their customers. Finally, investors do not immediately price the cash flow hedge information. Instead, investors appear surprised by future realizations of gross margin, consistent with the view that complex and incomplete disclosures delay pricing. These results are relevant to policymakers involved in the current FASB and IASB project designed to simplify the accounting and disclosure for derivatives and, in particular, cash flow hedges.

We examine a routine and timely disclosure, earnings press releases, to determine the extent to which several novel qualitative elements of such disclosures are associated with changes in sell‐side financial analysts' information environment. Using a comprehensive set of GARCH‐based (generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity) proxies, we examine how disclosure readability's components, across‐document textual similarity, and within‐document lexical diversity alter analysts' information environment. We find that readability in the form of shorter sentences, textual similarity, and lexical diversity are strongly related to decreases in analysts' uncertainty. Further, shorter sentences and lexical diversity improve both public and private information precision, whereas similarity affects solely analysts' private information precision. While the GARCH ‐based proxies allow us to alleviate concerns regarding potentially spurious inferences (Sheng and Thevenot 2012), we note as a caveat that such an estimation restricts our inferences to large, stable, and heavily followed firms. These findings should be of interest to analysts who may wish to explore the latent information contained within the qualitative elements of disclosure, regulators who direct the form and content of disclosure, and academics who study the use (and possible misuse) of various forms of information and its presentation.

Using a novel data set that tracks all web traffic on the SEC 's EDGAR servers from 2008 to 2011, we examine the determinants and capital market consequences of investor information acquisition of SEC filings. The average user employs the database very few times per quarter and most users target specific filing types such as periodic accounting reports; a small subset of users employ EDGAR almost daily and access many filings. EDGAR activity is positively related with corporate events (particularly restatements, earnings announcements, and acquisition announcements), poor stock performance, and the strength of a firm's information environment. EDGAR activity is related to, but distinct from, other proxies of investor interest such as trading volume, business press articles, and Google searches. Finally, information acquisition via EDGAR , both to obtain earnings news and to provide context for it, has a positive influence on market efficiency with respect to earnings news. Overall, our results are important because they provide a unique, user‐based perspective on investor access of mandatory disclosures and its impact on price formation.

This paper compares the value of political ties and market credibility in China by examining the consequence of corporate scandals. We categorize Chinese corporate scandals by whether the scandal is primarily associated with the destruction of (i) the firm's political networks (political scandals), (ii) the firm's market credibility (market scandals), or (iii) both (mixed scandals). Consistent with our hypothesis that scandals signaling the destruction of political ties are associated with greater losses in firm value than scandals signaling the destruction of market credibility, we find that the stock market reacts more negatively to political and mixed scandals than to market scandals. In addition, the greater negative market reactions associated with political and mixed scandals are primarily driven by firms that rely more on political networks. We also find that, compared to market scandals, political and mixed scandals lead to larger decreases in operating performance, greater reduction in loans from state‐owned banks, and higher departure of political directors.

Should incentive contracts expose the agent to market‐wide shocks? Counterintuitively, I show that market risk cannot be filtered out from the compensation and managed independently by the agent. Under plausible risk preferences, the principal should offer a contract in which performance pay increases following a favorable market shock. In the aggregate, however, the effect of market risk on individual contracts diversifies away and the agency problem does not directly affect the cost of capital. The analysis suggests caution in interpreting changes in cost of capital in terms of the stewardship role of accounting information.