Knowledge that Transforms

We study the response of international investment flows to shortand long-run growth news. Among developed G7 countries, positive long-run news for domestic productivity induces a net outflow of investments, in contrast to the effects of short-run growth shocks. We document that a standard Backus, Keho, and Kydland (1994) (BKK) model fails to reproduce this novel empirical evidence. We augment this model with Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences (EZ-BKK) and characterize the resulting recursive risk-sharing scheme. The response of international capital flows in the EZ-BKK model is consistent with the data.

This paper provides new evidence on the effects of moving out of disadvantaged neighborhoods on the long-run outcomes of children. I study public housing demolitions in Chicago, which forced low-income households to relocate to less disadvantaged neighborhoods using housing vouchers. Specifically, I compare young adult outcomes of displaced children to their peers who lived in nearby public housing that was not demolished. Displaced children are more likely to be employed and earn more in young adulthood. I also find that displaced children have fewer violent crime arrests. Children displaced at young ages have lower high school dropout rates.

We show that skill requirements in job vacancy postings differentially increased in MSAs that were hit hard by the Great Recession, relative to less hard-hit areas. These increases persist through at least the end of 2015 and are correlated with increases in capital investments, both at the MSA and firm levels. We also find that effects are most pronounced in routine-cognitive occupations, which exhibit relative wage growth as well. We argue that this evidence is consistent with the restructuring of production toward routine-biased technologies and the more-skilled workers that complement them, and that the Great Recession accelerated this process.

We present an infinite-horizon model of endogenous trading in the art auction market. Agents make purchase and sale decisions based on the relative magnitude of their private use value in each period. Our model generates endogenous cross-sectional and time-series patterns in investment outcomes. Average returns and buy-in probabilities are negatively correlated with the time between purchase and resale (attempt). Idiosyncratic risk does not converge to zero as the holding period shrinks. Prices and auction volume increase during expansions. Our model finds empirical support in auction data and has implications for selection biases in observed prices and transaction-based price indexes.

Many skilled professional occupations are characterized by an early period of intensive skill accumulation and career establishment. Examples include law firm associates, surgical residents, and untenured faculty at research-intensive universities. High female exit rates are sometimes blamed on the inability of new mothers to survive the sustained negative productivity shock associated with childbearing and early childrearing in these environments. Gender-neutral family policies have been adopted in some professions in an attempt to “level the playing field.” The gender-neutral tenure clock stopping policies adopted by the majority of research-intensive universities in the United States in recent decades are an excellent example. But to date, there is no empirical evidence showing that these policies help women. Using a unique dataset on the universe of assistant professor hires at top-50 economics departments from 1980–2005, we show that the adoption of gender-neutral tenure clock stopping policies substantially reduced female tenure rates while substantially increasing male tenure rates. However, these policies do not reduce the probability that either men or women eventually earn tenure in the profession.

How does the economy respond to news about future policies or future fundamentals? Standard practice assumes that agents have common knowledge of such news and face no uncertainty about how others will respond. Relaxing this assumption attenuates the general equilibrium effects of news and rationalizes a form of myopia at the aggregate level. We establish these insights within a class of games which nests, but is not limited to, the New Keynesian model. Our results help resolve the forward-guidance puzzle, offer a rationale for the front-loading of fiscal stimuli, and illustrate more broadly the fragility of predictions that rest on long series of forward-looking feedback loops.

I appreciate the clarification of my work by Tan and Wright, regret the confusing way my equations were labeled, and intended them to be interpreted in the manner they suggest is correct.

This paper proposes a theory of the fiscal foundations of inflation based on imperfect knowledge and learning. Because imperfect knowledge breaks Ricardian equivalence, the scale and composition of the public debt matter for inflation. High and moderate duration debt generates wealth effects on consumption demand that impairs the intertemporal substitution channel of monetary policy: aggressive monetary policy is required to anchor inflation expectations. Counterfactual experiments conducted in an estimated model reveal that the US economy would have been substantially more volatile over the Great Inflation and Great Moderation periods if US debt levels had been those observed in Italy or Japan.

I develop a simple model of social learning in which players observe others’ outcomes but not their actions. A continuum of players arrives continuously over time, and each player chooses once-and-for-all between a safe action (which succeeds with known probability) and a risky action (which succeeds with fixed but unknown probability, depending on the state of the world). The actions also differ in their costs. Before choosing, a player observes the outcomes of K earlier players. There is always an equilibrium in which success is more likely in the good state, and this alignment property holds whenever the initial generation of players is not well informed about the state. In the case of an outcome-improving innovation (where the risky action may yield a higher probability of success), players take the correct action as K → ∞. In the case of a cost-saving innovation (where the risky action involves saving a cost but accepting a lower probability of success), inefficiency persists as K → ∞ in any aligned equilibrium. Whether inefficiency takes the form of under-adoption or over-adoption also depends on the nature of the innovation. Convergence of the population to equilibrium may be nonmonotone.

We study the effects of a positive export shock on labor allocation between the informal, microenterprise sector and the formal firm sector in a low-income country. The United States-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement led to large reductions in US tariffs on Vietnamese exports. We find that the share of manufacturing workers in Vietnam in the formal sector increased by 5 percentage points in response to the US tariff reductions. The reallocation was greater for workers in more internationally integrated provinces and for younger cohorts. We estimate the gap in labor productivity within manufacturing across the informal and formal sectors. This gap and the aggregate labor productivity gain from the export-induced reallocation of workers across the two sectors are reduced when we account for worker heterogeneity, measurement error, and differences in labor intensity of production.