Knowledge that Transforms

This paper argues that a unified analysis of consumption and production is required to understand the long‐run behavior of the U.S. labor share. First, using household data on the universe of consumer spending, I document that higher‐income households spend relatively more on labor‐intensive goods and services as a share of their total consumption. Interpreted as nonhomothetic preferences, this fact implies that economic growth increases the aggregate labor share through an income effect. Second, using disaggregated data on factor shares and capital intensities, I document that equipment‐intensive goods experienced relatively larger declines in their labor shares. Based on this finding, I estimate that capital and labor are gross substitutes, and that investment‐specific technical change reduces the labor share. Given the estimated elasticities, a parsimonious neoclassical model quantitatively matches the observed low‐frequency movements in the aggregate labor share since the 1950s, both its relative stability until about 1980 and its decline thereafter.

We study extensive‐form games and mechanisms allowing agents that plan for only a subset of future decisions they may be called to make (the planning horizon ). Agents may update their so‐called strategic plan as the game progresses and new decision points enter their planning horizon. We introduce a family of simplicity standards which require that the prescribed action leads to unambiguously better outcomes, no matter what happens outside the planning horizon. We employ these standards to explore the trade‐off between simplicity and other objectives, to characterize simple mechanisms in a wide range of economic environments, and to delineate the simplicity of common mechanisms such as posted prices and ascending auctions, with the former being simpler than the latter.

This paper revisits the New Keynesian framework, theoretically and quantitatively, in an economy with multiple sectors and input‐output linkages. Analytical expressions for the Phillips curve and welfare, derived as a function of primitives, show that the slope of all sectoral and aggregate Phillips curves is decreasing in intermediate input shares, while productivity fluctuations endogenously generate an inflation‐output tradeoff—except when inflation is measured according to the novel divine coincidence index. Consistent with the theory, the divine coincidence index provides a better fit in Phillips curve regressions than consumer prices. Monetary policy can no longer achieve the first‐best, resulting in a welfare loss of 2.9% of per‐period GDP under the constrained‐optimal policy, which increases to 3.8% when targeting consumer inflation. The constrained‐optimal policy must tolerate relative price distortions across firms and sectors in order to stabilize the output gap, and it can be implemented via a Taylor rule that targets the divine coincidence index.

This paper shows that there is more scope for a borrower to engage in a sustainable infinite debt rollover (a “Ponzi scheme”) when interest/growth rates are stochastic. In this context, I prove that the relevant “r vs. g” comparison uses the yield r long to an infinite‐maturity zero‐coupon bond. I show that r long is lower than the risk‐neutral expectation of the short‐term yield when it is variable, and that r long is close to the minimal realization of the short‐term yield when it is highly persistent. The paper applies these results to illustrative heterogeneous agent dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models to obtain similarly weakened sufficient conditions for the existence of public debt bubbles.

In this paper, we present a unifying framework for analyzing equilibria and designing interventions for large network games sampled from a stochastic network formation process represented by a graphon. To this end, we introduce a new class of infinite population games, termed graphon games , in which a continuum of heterogeneous agents interact according to a graphon, and we show that equilibria of graphon games can be used to approximate equilibria of large network games sampled from the graphon. This suggests a new approach for design of interventions and parameter inference based on the limiting infinite population graphon game. We show that, under some regularity assumptions, such approach enables the design of asymptotically optimal interventions via the solution of an optimization problem with much lower dimension than the one based on the entire network structure. We illustrate our framework on a synthetic data set and show that the graphon intervention can be computed efficiently and based solely on aggregated relational data.

We document a strong empirical connection between corporate taxation and the manufacturing labor share, both in the US and across OECD countries. Our estimates associate 30 to 60% of the observed decline in labor shares with the fall in corporate taxation. Using an equilibrium model of an industry where firms differ in their capital intensities, we show that lower corporate tax rates reduce the labor share by raising the market share of capital‐intensive firms. The tax elasticity of the labor share depends on the joint distribution of labor intensities and value added at the micro level. Given the empirical distribution in the US manufacturing sector, our quantitative analysis suggests that corporate tax cuts explain a significant part of the decline in the manufacturing labor share since the 1950s. The shift away from traditionally large, labor‐intensive production units raised the concentration of market shares and reduced the concentration of employment.

I study the optimal provision of information in a long‐term relationship between a sender and a receiver. The sender observes a persistent, evolving state and commits to send signals over time to the receiver, who sequentially chooses public actions that affect the welfare of both players. I solve for the sender's optimal policy in closed form: the sender reports the value of the state with a delay that shrinks over time and eventually vanishes. Even when the receiver knows the current state, the sender retains leverage by threatening to conceal the future evolution of the state.

This paper discussed “Invidious Comparisons: Ranking and Selection as Compound Decisions” by Jiaying Gu and Roger Koenker.