Knowledge that Transforms

In the United States and Britain, there is a "family gap" between the wages of mothers and other women. Differential returns to marital and parental status explain 40%–50% of the gender gap. Another 30%–40% is explained by women's lower levels of work experience and lower returns to experience. Taking advantage of "quasi experiments" in job‐protected maternity leave in the United States and Britain, this article finds that women who had leave coverage and returned to work after childbirth received a wage premium that offset the negative wage effects of children.

This article uses various micro data sets to study entrepreneurship. Consistent with the existence of capital constraints on potential entrepreneurs, the estimates imply that the probability of self-employment depends positively upon whether the individual ever received an inheritance or gift. When directly questioned in interview surveys, potential entrepreneurs say that raising capital is their principal problem. Consistent with our theoretical model's predictions, the self-employed report higher levels of job and life satisfaction than employees. Childhood psychological test scores, however, are not strongly correlated with later self-employment.

The fall of Communism, the reassessment of Nordic social democracy, belt-tightening in other advanced welfare states, and the worldwide privatization wave have led many to conclude that egalitarianism is a merely utopian ideal, the possibility of whose realization is laid to rest by the failure of a series of twentieth-century social experiments. We survey the evidence, both empirical and theoretical, and conclude that obituaries are premature. Key theoretical errors in the design of egalitarian experiments, and in some critiques of pro-egalitarian policies, concern the role of information asymmetries, and we argue that their proper understanding re-opens possibilities for increasing equality without unacceptable sacrifices in efficiency.

Evolutionary game theory provides an answer to two of the central questions in economic modeling: when is it reasonable to assume that people are rational? And, when is it reasonable to assume that behavior is part of a Nash equilibrium (and if it is reasonable, which equilibrium)? The traditional answers are not compelling, and much of evolutionary modeling is motivated by the need for a better answer. Evolutionary game theory suggests that, in a range of settings, agents do (eventually) play a Nash equilibrium. Moreover, evolutionary modeling has shed light on the relative plausibility of different Nash equilibria.

Specialists in labor economics and public economics at 40 leading research universities provided opinions of policy proposals, quantitative best estimates and 95-percent confidence intervals for economic parameters, and answers to values questions regarding income redistribution, efficiency versus equity, and individual versus social responsibility. Their positions on policy are more closely related to their values than to their estimates of relevant economic parameters. Average best estimates of the economic parameters agree well with the relevant literature, but individual best estimates are usually widely dispersed. The individual 95-percent confidence intervals are much narrower than the substantial cross-respondent variation in estimates would warrant.

It has now been over twenty-five years since Arnold Harberger (1971) published his open letter to the profession, in which he proposed a set of guidelines for applied welfare economics. Since then, there has been great progress in the implementation of measures of welfare that are ordinally equivalent to household utility. While welfare measurement at the micro level is of independent interest, of greater practical concern is the issue of the well-being of groups of households. In the second half of the survey, I examine the issue of the aggregation of welfare across households and describe a framework that provides a consistent ranking of social outcomes.

Wagering markets provide a natural laboratory for testing models of market prices and behavior under uncertainty. The literature on wagering, albeit contentious, has established the following. First, prices set in these markets, to a first approximation, are efficient forecasts of outcomes. Second, price changes in these markets are driven by an informed class of bettors and improve prediction. Nevertheless, there are important departures from generic notions of market efficiency. Recent models focusing on diverse information, heterogeneous agents, and transaction costs help to explain these findings.