Knowledge that Transforms

This article studies a particular kind of gaming responses to explicit incentives in a large government organization. The gaming responses we consider occur when agents strategically report their performance outcomes to maximize their awards. An important contribution of this work is to examine whether this behavior diverts resources (e.g., agents’ time) from productive activities or whether it simply reflects an accounting phenomenon. We evaluate the efficiency impact of the behavior we identify and find that it has a negative impact on the true goal of the organization.

We examine the empirical relationship between early employment activity and school continuation decisions for young American women using a dynamic, sequential discrete‐choice framework that estimates schooling, labor supply, and birth decisions jointly, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and the endogeneity of these life cycle decisions. That the rate of school withdrawal increases as work intensity rises helps explain the higher departure rates of Hispanic girls from secondary school and the premature departure of young black women from college. The disturbing implication is that youth employment induces long‐run wage stagnation for early school leavers and potentially increases race and ethnic inequities.

Wages for black and white workers are substantially lower in occupations with a high density of black employees, following standard controls. Such correlations can exist absent discrimination or as a result of discrimination. In wage level equations, partial correlations fall sharply after controlling for occupational skills. Longitudinal estimates accounting for worker heterogeneity indicate little wage change associated with changes in racial composition. Results support a “quality sorting” rather than discrimination explanation, with racial density serving as an index of unmeasured skills. Discrimination reflected in racial wage gaps occurs within occupations or across occupations in a manner uncorrelated with racial composition.

To get a more complete picture of how labor supply is affected by economic incentives, the effects on absenteeism should be taken into account. In particular, absenteeism due to sick leave can be considerable. We examine whether the level of sick leave compensation affects sick leave behavior. Using long time series data (1955–99) for Sweden with numerous changes of the compensation level, we generally find strong effects. Reforms implying more generous compensation for sick leave tend to be associated with permanent increases in sick leave, and vice versa. These findings are reinforced in a panel study covering the 1983–91 period.

We compare welfare effects of tournaments and piece rates in contracts with heterogeneous ability agents and demonstrate that tournaments that mix players of unequal abilities create a league composition effect. When leagues are fixed and the time horizon sufficiently long, piece rates improve welfare over tournaments. Using contract production data for broiler chickens, we estimate the variances of growers’ abilities, common production shock, and grower’s idiosyncratic shock. Growers' abilities are heterogeneous, and common production shocks are significant. Leagues in broiler tournaments disintegrate rapidly over time, suggesting that tournament contracts offer more welfare than piece rates.

We analyze recent changes in the occupational structure of French manufacturing firms. Firms employ a greater proportion of engineers working on the design and marketing of new products and a lower proportion of high‐skill experts working in administration‐related activities. Firms have also reduced the share of production‐related activities at both the levels of high‐skill and low‐skill workers. We develop a labor demand model that shows the role played by technological change. New technologies make it possible to allocate more human resources to the activities that are the most difficult to program in advance.

We investigate an unexplored avenue through which unemployment insurance increases unemployment. As unemployment insurance benefits rise, workers lose incentive to “preempt” impending layoffs by changing jobs. We formalize this prediction in a job search model and investigate it empirically by estimating a proportional hazard model with data from the 1979 National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, using state‐ and year‐specific algorithms to compute each worker’s expected unemployment insurance benefits. Our estimates reveal that an exogenous increase in benefits deters job quits by a small but statistically significant amount.

Existing empirical estimates of net migration models are not identified because they lack an explicit measure of expected future conditions. I find that using actual one‐period‐ahead net migration at the state level to control for expectations reduces the strength of the relationship between current wages and net migration by more than one‐third. I use the case of Michigan to show how existing empirical models mischaracterize the response of migration to shocks that are expected to be transitory. I add migration to a labor market model and simulate responses to permanent and transitory demand shocks.

This article examines the effects of a change in the Canada/Quebec Pension Plan (C/QPP) disability benefits on the labor supply of older Canadian workers. I obtain my estimates by exploiting a large increase in benefits that only occurred in the QPP program, which only operates in Quebec, while benefits in the CPP program, which operates in the rest of Canada, were unaffected. Unlike the existing estimates from the United States, as well as earlier Canadian obtained by Gruber, I find that disability benefits are not associated with a large increase in the nonparticipation of older men.

Using the personnel records of a large British financial sector employer we investigate how workers respond to remuneration differences and “luck” in the promotion system. The results confirm that workers respond to larger remuneration spreads by working harder. Increased certainty in the promotion process also has this effect. There appears to be no difference between men’s and women’s reactions to promotion incentives. Gender differences in the raw data therefore appear not due to incentives. We need to look elsewhere for an explanation.