Knowledge that Transforms

Weak environmental regulation has global consequences. When domestic regulation fails, the international community can target emitters with trade policy. I develop a dynamic empirical framework for evaluating trade policy as a substitute for domestic regulation, and I apply the framework to the market for palm oil, a major driver of deforestation and global CO 2 emissions. Relative to business as usual, a domestic production tax of 50% reduces CO 2 emissions by 7.4 Gt from 1988 to 2016, amounting to 0.26 Gt annually. Coordinated, committed import tariffs of similar magnitude reduce emissions by 5.4 Gt over the same period. The cost of these import tariffs is only $15 per ton of CO 2 , even accounting for compensating transfers that recognize welfare losses for producing countries. Without coordination and commitment, import tariffs have more limited effects. Alternative policies include domestic export taxes, which are fiscally appealing independent of emission concerns, and a carbon border adjustment mechanism, which encourages domestic regulation.

Macroeconomic outcomes depend on the distribution of markups across firms and over time, making firm‐level markup estimates key for macroeconomic analysis. Methods to obtain these estimates require data on the prices that firms charge. Firm‐level data with wide coverage, however, primarily come from financial statements, which lack information on prices. We use an analytical framework to show that trends in markups over time or the dispersion of markups across firms can still be well‐measured with such data. Measuring the average level of the markup does require pricing data, and we propose a consistent estimator for such settings. We validate the analytical results using simulations of a quantitative macroeconomic model and offer supporting evidence from firm‐level administrative production and pricing data. Our analysis supports the use of financial data to measure trends in aggregate markups.

Governments use their countries' economic strength from financial and trade relationships to achieve geopolitical and economic goals. We provide a model of the sources of geoeconomic power and how it is wielded. The source of this power is the ability of a hegemonic country to coordinate threats across disparate economic relationships as a means of enforcement on foreign entities. The hegemon wields this power to demand costly actions out of the targeted entities, including mark‐ups, import restrictions, tariffs, and political concessions. The hegemon uses its power to change targeted entities' activities to manipulate the global equilibrium in its favor and increase its power. A sector is strategic either in helping the hegemon form threats or in manipulating the world equilibrium via input‐output amplification. The hegemon acts a global enforcer, thus adding value to the world economy, but destroys value by distorting the equilibrium in its favor.

Using multiple administrative data sources from Norway, we examine how firm performance changes after entrepreneurs become parents.Female-owned businesses experience a substantial decline in profits, steadily decreasing to 30% below baseline ten years post-childbirth.In contrast, male-owned businesses show no decline, often growing in revenues and costs after childbirth.The profit decline for female-owned firms is most pronounced among highly capable entrepreneurs, women who are majority owners, and those with working spouses.Entrepreneurial effort is key to performance, and our findings suggest that time demands from childbirth and childcare are a significant determinant of the decline in firm profits.