Knowledge that Transforms

We study the impact of large, successful manufacturing plants on other local producers in China, focusing on “Million-Rouble Plants” built in the 1950s during a brief alliance with the U.S.S.R. The ephemeral geopolitical situation and the locations of allied and enemy airbases provide exogenous variation in plant siting. We find a boom-and-bust pattern: Counties hosting these plants were 80% more productive than control counties in 1982 but 20% less productive by 2010. This decline reflects the performance of local establishments, which exhibit low productivity, limited innovation, and high markup. Specialization hindered spillovers, preventing the emergence of new clusters and local entrepreneurship.

Using a unique dataset of Chinese households, we document a robust negative causal effect of past house price growth on local entrepreneurial activity. This finding stands in sharp contrast to a positive effect typically documented in developed countries. We find that strong past house price growth fosters extrapolative housing-market optimism and stimulates greater housing investment. Consistent with crowding out, housing optimism — and the ensuing surge in housing investment — redirects resources away from entrepreneurship. This belief-based channel highlights an important mechanism through which housing booms may dampen real economic activity in emerging markets.

We empirically investigate the impact of financial analysts' integrity on their information outputs and career success. Using analysts' off‐the‐job behavior, specifically their legal records, to proxy for analyst integrity, we predict and find that weak‐integrity analysts engage more in opportunistic behaviors, including “speaking in two tongues” and earnings forecast walk‐down. These analysts obtain favorable management access and make more accurate earnings forecasts. Further analyses indicate that while the market as a whole does not distinguish weak‐integrity analysts from others, sophisticated investors discount their information outputs. Weak‐integrity analysts also experience less favorable career outcomes. Our results have important implications for investors, professional bodies, employers, and regulators.

With the widespread use of narrative feedback in companies, understanding how such feedback can be valuable for employee performance improvement is important. Drawing on proprietary data from an e‐commerce company, we investigate the role of specificity and causality—two key language characteristics for self‐regulation and learning. Our findings suggest that neither specificity nor causality is always beneficial; instead, their effects depend on whether the feedback refers to strengths or weaknesses. Specifically, employees are more likely to improve when they receive more specific narrative feedback on their strengths, consistent with employees engaging in more systematic exploration when feedback provides concrete references to desirable behaviors. In contrast, we find that increases in the specificity of narrative feedback on weaknesses can have negative performance consequences, as employees who are confronted with many specific examples of undesirable behaviors may attempt too many behavioral changes at once, undermining learning and improvement. Furthermore, employees are more likely to improve when feedback on their weaknesses uses more causal language, suggesting that explanations of why certain behaviors were ineffective help employees understand and correct those behaviors. Our study informs HR leaders, supervisors, and experts responsible for designing management control systems by showing that narrative feedback should be specific when describing strengths, but more selective and richer in causal explanations when addressing weaknesses.

This study examines how passive institutional investors reshape corporate venture capital (CVC) investment decisions. We find that increases in passive institutional ownership lead firms to cut back CVC investments in non-core, high-risk, and low-quality ventures, with the reduction being more pronounced among firms subject to more severe managerial agency problems. Futhermore, the reduction of CVC investments leads to higher short-term announcement returns and improved long-term operating and innovation performance. The findings suggest that passive institutional investors mitigate managerial agency problems and improve innovation by disciplining CVC investment decisions.

This paper quantifies how investors’ portfolio demand responds to price changes at long horizons versus short horizons. Using investor trades – changes in portfolios – at different horizons, I first present reduced-form evidence that elasticities increase significantly over time. I then propose a dynamic demand system via a parsimonious partial-adjustment model that recovers the full term structure of elasticities while mitigating long-horizon identification challenges. The estimates imply that price impacts are three times larger at quarterly horizons than in the long-run equilibrium. The model produces a novel, stock-level measure of long-term reversal that avoids the noise of long-horizon return regressions.

We review the empirical accounting literature on private firms. Recent advances in data gathering provide new openings to examine private firms which, despite driving half of private sector economic activity, have historically been challenging to study. We provide a conceptual framework to organize the literature, centering on information production, information verification, and information dissemination. Four key takeaways emerge from our review. First, private firm settings offer unique advantages for understanding the economic role of accounting. Because private firms face less regulation than public firms, their accounting choices can shed light on economic tradeoffs that public firm choices cannot. Second, there is limited descriptive evidence on many fundamental accounting choices, including the extent to which private firms follow US GAAP, obtain an audit, or use various management accounting practices. Third, studies jointly modeling private and public firms provide more complete, robust analyses of the economy, regulation in particular. Fourth, private and public firms differ on many central dimensions, which raises difficulties related to conducting empirical analysis and assessing generalizability.