This article is a reexamination of the clearing and settlement process in financial markets (particularly the futures market) and its performance during the 1987 stock market crash. It provides both some institutional background and some conceptual perspective on the problems faced by the system during the week of October 19. Much of the discussion is based on the useful analogies that can be drawn between the clearinghouse and other financial intermediaries, such as banks and insurance companies. A major conclusion is that the Federal Reserve played a vital role in protecting the integrity of the clearing and settlements system during the crash.

[This article is a reexamination of the clearing and settlement process in financial markets (particularly the futures market) and its performance during the 1987 stock market crash. It provides both some institutional background and some conceptual perspective on the problems faced by the system during the week of October 19. Much of the discussion is based on the useful analogies that can be drawn between the clearinghouse and other financial intermediaries, such as banks and insurance companies. A major conclusion is that the Federal Reserve played a vital role in protecting the integrity of the clearing and settlements system during the crash.]

Several recent papers have tested the permanent income-cum-rational expectations hypothesis using data on nondurable or semidurable consumption. We show how this approach can be extended to the case of durables. An application to panel data on automobile expenditures reveals no evidence against the permanent income hypothesis. This result is unchanged in subsamples segregated by family holdings of liquid assets.

The optimal timing of real investment is studied under the assumptions that investment is irreversible and that new information about returns is arriving over time. Investment should be undertaken in this case only when the costs of deferring the project exceed the expected value of inforrnation gained by waiting. Uncertainty, because it increases the value of waiting for new information, retards the current rate of investment. The nature of investor's optimal reactions to events whose implications are resolved over time is a possible explanation of the instability of aggregate investment over the business cycle.

Because it concentrates on the co-movements of jointly determined endogenous variables, the traditional analysts of labor productivity does not directly address the question of the causes of productivity change.This problem is solved by a modelling approach in which productivity and other choice variables are assumed to respond optimally to five broad classes of exogenous (causal) shocks.Although these shocks are unobservable to the econometrician, maximum likelihood estimates of their relative importance in the determination of productivity change are obtained.

Credit markets, including the market for bank loans, are characterized by imperfect and asymmetric information. These informational frictions can interact with other economic forces to produce periods of credit-market stress, in which intermediation is unusually costly and households and businesses have difficulty obtaining credit. A high level of credit-market stress, as in a severe financial crisis, may in turn produce a deep and prolonged recession. I present evidence that financial distress and disrupted credit markets were important sources of the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession of 2007–2009. Changes in the state of credit markets also play a role in “ garden-variety” business cycles and in the transmission of monetary policy to the economy. (JEL D82, E32, E44, E52, G21, N22)

To overcome the limits on traditional monetary policy imposed by the effective lower bound on short-term interest rates, in recent years the Federal Reserve and other advanced-economy central banks have deployed new policy tools. This lecture reviews what we know about the new monetary tools, focusing on quantitative easing (QE) and forward guidance, the principal new tools used by the Fed. I argue that the new tools have proven effective at easing financial conditions when policy rates are constrained by the lower bound, even when financial markets are functioning normally, and that they can be made even more effective in the future. Accordingly, the new tools should become part of the standard central bank toolkit. Simulations of the Fed’s FRB/US model suggest that, if the nominal neutral interest rate is in the range of 2–3 percent, consistent with most estimates for the United States, then a combination of QE and forward guidance can provide the equivalent of roughly 3 percentage points of policy space, largely offsetting the effects of the lower bound. If the neutral rate is much lower, however, then overcoming the effects of the lower bound may require additional measures, such as a moderate increase in the inflation target or greater reliance on fiscal policy for economic stabilization. (JEL D78, E31, E43, E52, E58, E62)

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