Lars Peter Hansen and Thomas J. Sargent's book, Recursive Models of Dynamic Linear Economies, exposits, extends, and applies methods for solution and analysis of dynamic stochastic linear quadratic models. The book, which can be used as a monograph or in a graduate course, integrates theory, econometrics, and computation. This essay provides a summary and offers some mild complaints about material not included in what is already a remarkably comprehensive book.

The Term Auction Facility (TAF) was designed by the Federal Reserve during the financial crisis to inject emergency short-term funds into banks, as a supplement to the lender of last resort discount window offerings. We describe how the Federal Reserve altered the design of the Term Auction Facility (TAF) over the course of the financial crisis and examine the utilization of this stand-alone facility. Most specifically we detail the impact of the greatly increased offering amounts in all auctions after October 2008, which resulted in the facility no longer auctioning scarcely available funds. We also document significantly different usage of the facility by FDIC-insured community and non-community banks, consistent with the notion of a two-tiered banking system in the U.S. Community banks were far less likely to use the facility than larger, non-community banks.

Most existing macro-finance term structure models (MTSMs) appear incompatible with regression evidence of unspanned macro risk. This “spanning puzzle” appears to invalidate those models in favor of new unspanned MTSMs. However, our empirical analysis supports the previous spanned models. Using simulations to investigate the spanning implications of MTSMs, we show that a canonical spanned model is consistent with the regression evidence; thus, we resolve the spanning puzzle. In addition, direct likelihood-ratio tests find that the knife-edge restrictions of unspanned models are rejected with high statistical significance, though these restrictions have only small effects on cross-sectional fit and estimated term premia.

Although governments are the majority shareholders in many of the world's largest and most important firms, we know very little about the role of the state as majority shareholder and the potential agency conflicts that exist between the state (as controlling shareholder) and the minority shareholder in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Our study provides new insights regarding the private benefits that may be captured when the state is dominant shareholder (what we refer to as the “private benefits of state control”). We define the private benefits of state control as the political, social, or personal advantages that the controlling politician may be able to extract from the SOE. We identify firm-level and institution-level factors that may impact the amount of the private benefits of state control and present evidence that the private benefits of state control affect economic decision-making.

Firms whose human capital is concentrated in a few irreplaceable employees lack diversification in their human capital stock, exposing them to key human capital risk. Using disclosures of “key man life insurance” to measure this risk, we show that exposed firms are riskier. These younger, smaller, growth firms have abnormally high volatility, and following announcement of key employee departures, the most exposed firms lose 8% of their value. Key employees tend to be highly educated. They are four times more likely to hold PhD degrees than top managers, and firms with key human capital are more innovative.

An important disconnect in the news view of fluctuations is the lack of consistent evidence suggestive of significant macroeconomic effects of news shocks. Findings from estimated DSGE models that in theory allow news shocks to matter quantitatively suggest that they do not. This disconnect can be resolved once we augment a DSGE model with a financial channel that provides amplification to news shocks. Our results suggest that news shocks to the future growth prospects of the economy are significant drivers of U.S. fluctuations, explaining as much as 50% and 37% of the variance in hours worked and output, respectively, in cyclical frequencies.

We propose a framework that advances our understanding of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) retention decisions in misreporting firms. Consistent with economic intuition, outside directors are more likely to fire (retain) CEOs when retention (replacement) costs are high relative to replacement (retention) costs. When the decision is ambiguous because neither cost dominates, outside directors are more likely to retain the CEO when they both benefit from selling stock in the misreporting period. We show that joint abnormal selling captures director–CEO alignment incrementally to biographical overlap. This new proxy operationalizes information sharing and trust, making it useful for studying economic decision-making embedded in social relationships.